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Unearthing the Origins of Quasi-Property Status
ALIX ROGERS†
Under contemporary American law, human corpses and some bodily parts are classified as quasiproperty. Quasi-property is an American legal conception composed of limited interests that
mimic some of the functions of property, but does not formally qualify as property. It is a uniquely
American, idiosyncratic and misunderstood legal category. Quasi-property status is most
typically associated with intellectual property given the Supreme Court decision of International
News Services v. Associated Press. That human remains and bodily materials are classified as
quasi-property is less well known. The confusion surrounding the quasi-property status of the
dead has negative implications for current and future research, medicine and broader society.
Litigation surrounding the treatment and status of those who died in the 9/11 World Trade Center
attack hinged on quasi-property. Clearly resolving the quasi-property status of the dead is
becoming increasingly important in the wake of biotechnological advances. In March 2018, a Y
Combinator startup, Nectome, promised to preserve, digitize and reanimate brains. The project
is concerning for many reasons, but one major concern is the ambiguous status of the dead that
the company will experiment upon.
This Article explores the origins of quasi-property and investigates why American judges ascribed
quasi-property status to human remains. The adoption of quasi-property status is notable because
judges broke with hundreds of years of inherited common law, and forsook a legal tenant
prescribed by Blackstone and Coke. Understanding its origins, therefore, has broader
implications for our understanding of the development of American law. I show that the academic
literature and case law have mistaken both the origin of, and reasoning behind quasi-property
status. Scholars and judges cite an 1872 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision as the
foundational case on quasi-property status of the dead. My research shows that, in fact, the first
case occurred instead in Cleveland, Ohio, a year earlier. Further, my analysis of this initial case,
and surrounding socio-cultureal context, reframes our understanding of the forces behind quasiproperty status. The traditional account in the literature and case law of the emergence of quasiproperty status points to America’s lack of ecclesiastical courts, which historically had
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jurisdiction over cemeteries and burial in England. I argue that the existing explanation does not
sufficiently account for the initial application, the dominance, or the persistence of the unique
status of quasi-property by American courts. This Article advances a novel argument that sociocultural changes forged in the maelstrom of the Civil War precipitated the initial use and later
systematic adoption by American courts of quasi-property status for human remains. My
discovery and re-examination of the subsequent rise of quasi-property at the turn of the nineteenth
century has important implications for how contemporary courts should conceive of this deeply
contested legal category.
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The dead body of a human being is almost the only moveable object known
to me which by our law is no one’s property, and cannot, so long at all events
as it exists as such, become the property of any one.
— Sir James Fitzjames Stephen (1883)1

INTRODUCTION
Property law is a foundational common law category, which simplistically
stated, governs legal rights and duties in relation to “things.” Almost every
physical object or product of intellectual labor is classified as legal property.
Property law governs an individual’s use of, and relationship to, all of these
physical and non-physical things. In the United States, a limited set of physical
entities are exempt from property status. Most famously, with the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment, living human beings cannot be objects of property.2
Less well known is that deceased human bodies are also not legal property.3 The
prohibition on property status for human remains predates the Thirteenth
Amendment by hundreds of years. It was inherited from medieval English
common law and perpetuated in the United States. Thus, for roughly a hundred
years in American law, some living, but no dead bodies, were objects of legal
property.4 In contemporary American law, the preclusion from property status
for deceased human bodies is notable for a different reason. Human remains are
the only non-living physically moveable objects that are explicitly excluded
from property status.5
Juxtaposed against the prohibition on slavery at first glance, the exclusion
of deceased human bodies is appealing on an emotional and symbolic level. As
the remaining physical form of departed loved ones, bodies are symbolically,
religiously, and morally significant. Legally, however, the lack of property
status is perplexing. The civil legal corpus that is generally designed to protect
non-living objects, namely property law, and living entities, namely tort law,
1. 3 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 127 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2014) (1883).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
3. The origin of non-property status for human remains in American law has a separate etiology from the
Thirteenth Amendment. It was inherited from medieval English common law, largely maintained in
contemporary American common law. However, as this Article will show, the status of the living and the dead
in the United States is more intertwined in American history than previously understood. See Tanya K.
Hernández, The Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 992–97 (1999); see also P.G.D. Skegg, Human
Corpses, Medical Specimens and the Law of Property, 4 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 412, 412–16 (1975) (discussing
the history of non-property status in English common law).
4. As will be seen this meant that technically the bodies of dead slaves were no longer legal property.
Death legally set them free.
5. There is some debate as to whether human embryos and living tissues are objects of legal property.
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that embryos are judicial persons). However,
there is an emerging consensus in most states that embryos are property. See McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d
127, 147–49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that frozen embryos are marital property of a special character); In
re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 591 (Colo. 2018) (holding that frozen embryos are not persons but marital
property).
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does not apply. The taking of a corpse is not theft, nor is it false imprisonment.6
As will be shown, non-property status originally resulted in a form of legal limbo
for human remains. Human bodies existed outside the jurisdiction of the civil
law. This is no longer the case in contemporary American law. American courts
asserted jurisdiction over human remains during the nineteenth century.
Jurisdiction was claimed, however, in an unconventional way. The legal status
of human remains operates in a relatively unique sphere of American law, that
of quasi-property.7 The decision by judges to claim jurisdiction, and to create,
apply, and perpetuate quasi-property was a deliberate one. Yet, examination of
the origins of this shift, and the nature of quasi-property in the academic
literature, remains markedly scant.8
Quasi-property is most commonly associated with intellectual property and
“hot” news information from the Supreme Court’s 1918 decision in
International News Service v. Associated Press,9 but it has also been applied to
other forms of intellectual property, such as trademarks.10 Despite the dominant
association with news information, human remains were the first subjects to
which American jurists systematically applied quasi-property. As I demonstrate
below, quasi-property for human remains may have served as the inspiration for
Pitney’s use of quasi-property in the INS decision.11 Quasi-property is an
American common law conception composed of limited interests that mimic
some of the functions of property, but does not formally qualify as property.
Quasi-property is distinct from property, such that traditional property causes of
action, like conversion, do not apply.12 Less well known than quasi-tort and
6. Skegg, supra note 3, at 412–13. Blackstone is generally believed to have originated the prescription
against theft. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *235.
7. For instance, in Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., quasi-property was noted as the prevailing view.
186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936); see also William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need
to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 711 (1995) (citing Ga. Lions Eye
Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985); McCoy v. Ga. Baptist Hosp., 306 S.E.2d 746, 747–48 (Ga. Ct. App.
1983); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976); Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S.
471, 474 (App. Div. 1896); and Diebler v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 92 N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (Sup.
Ct. 1949)).
8. For the most complete examination of quasi-property, see generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, QuasiProperty: Like, but Not Quite Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (2012). However, the article does not explore
the origins of the term.
9. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
10. Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 687 (W.D. Ky. 2010)
(“The purpose of the trademark statutes is to protect the trademark holder’s quasi-property interest in the mark
and prevent consumer confusion about the actual source of goods using the mark.”), aff’d, 679 F.3d 410, 414
(6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964–65 (6th Cir. 1987)); see
also Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 547 (6th Cir. 2006); AutoZone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786,
801 (6th Cir. 2004); Balganesh, supra note 8, at 1897–98.
11. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236.
12. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan held in Keyes v. Konkel that, given quasi-property status,
plaintiffs should seek a claim in equity under infringement of quasi-property rights, not a replevin property claim
if a corpse is retained:
The question presented is whether replevin will lie in this state for a human corpse. The
question is happily more novel than difficult. The statute provides for the proceeding of replevin
in the justice court, and requires an affidavit by the plaintiff setting forth that his “personal goods
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quasi-contract, quasi-property is similarly applied in situations where the law
creates property-like entitlements, but distinguishes them from being truly
proprietary in nature. Shyamkrishna Balganesh described quasi-property as
arising in situations where “the law attempts to simulate the functioning of
property’s exclusionary apparatus.”13
Unfortunately, the exact content, nature, and remedies associated with
quasi-property have not been fully articulated in the case law. This is particularly
true with regards to the quasi-property status of human remains. For instance, in
Amaker v. King County, a 2008 case wherein the organs of the decedent were
taken without consent for medical research, the Ninth Circuit lamented the lack
of a definitive statement of relevant state case law on quasi-property as to who
“should be able to pursue this claim and what limits to impose on liability.”14
Quasi-property as a legal category has been subject to criticism in the law and
literature both generally, and with regard to the law of the human body.15 Most
state courts recognize quasi-property as an independent category.16 Yet, some
state courts continue to use the language of quasi-property, but have explicitly

and chattels” have been unlawfully taken or are unlawfully detained. The replevin statutes provide
for a judgment for defendant, when the plaintiff fails in his case, for a return of the property or for
its value. It is apparent that no return of the property can be ordered in case of the replevin of a
dead body, and it is equally true that its value in money can neither be appraised nor ascertained
by a jury.
78 N.W. 649, 649 (Mich. 1899) (citations omitted).
13. Balganesh, supra note 8, at 1891 (emphasis omitted).
14. Amaker v. King County, 540 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2008). Similarly, the Connecticut Superior
Court noted that, “[t]he reach of this ‘quasi-property’ right is uncertain.” Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744
A.2d 963, 968 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
15. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 63 (W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E.
Keeton, & David G. Owen eds., 5th ed. 1984); Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U.
L. REV. 359, 384–87 (2000).
16. Walter F. Kuzenski, Property in Dead Bodies, 9 MARQ. L. REV. 17, 22 (1924) (“[T]he greater majority
of states where the subject has been litigated hold that there is a special or quasi property in a dead body.”);
Thomas D. Holland, “Since I Must Please Those Below”: Human Skeletal Remains Research and the Law, 41
AM. J.L. & MED. 617, 632 (2015) (“Most jurisdictions now recognize a survivor’s quasi-property right in the
remains of the family member . . . .”). California, for example, first addressed the issue of rights to human
remains in the 1899 California Supreme Court case O’Donnell v. Slack. 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899). The opinion
relies heavily upon the quasi-property case of Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872).
Id. at 289. Subsequent later courts have affirmed quasi-property status in the state. Newman v.
Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002); Holm v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1241, 1245
(Ct. App. 1986); Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 1110 n.13 (Ct. App. 1976); Cohen v. Groman
Mortuary, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 2d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 1964), overruled on other grounds, Christensen v. Superior
Court, 820 P.2d 181, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). For examples from other states, see Ritter v. Couch, 76 S.E. 428,
430 (W. Va. 1912); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) (Louisiana law); Fuller v. Marx, 724
F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arkansas law); Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632, 634–35 (8th Cir. 1983)
(Missouri law); State v. Powell, 497 So.2d 1188, 1191–92 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 1059 (1987);
McCoy v. Ga. Baptist Hosp., 306 S.E.2d 746, 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); Litteral v. Litteral, 111 S.W. 872, 873–
74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem’l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 350 (N.J. 1988); In re
Johnson, 612 P.3d 1302, 1305 (N.M. 1980); Danahy v. Kellogg, 126 N.Y.S. 444, 446 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Carney
v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Ohio 1986); Bash v. Fir Grove Cemeteries, Co., 581 P.2d
75, 79 (Or. 1978); In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.5 (Utah 1978).
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stated that the term is conceived of as a legal fiction. In New York, for example,
it has been held that
[r]ecovery in these cases has ostensibly been grounded on a violation
of the relative’s quasi-property right in the body. It has been
noted . . . that . . . such a property right is little more than a fiction; in
reality, the personal feelings of the survivors are being protected.17

Moreover, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts dismisses the quasiproperty status of human remains as a legal fiction as “likely to deceive no one
but a lawyer.”18 The Restatement of Torts states that, “[i]n practice the technical
right has served as a mere peg upon which to hang damages for the mental
distress inflicted upon the survivor.”19 As will be shown, this Article
demonstrates that quasi-property has functional utility and legal significance
beyond mental distress.20
The contemporary social and legal problem represented by the ambiguity
of, and hostility to, quasi-property is a serious one. The tort of emotional distress
and contract law can apply, but often quasi-property actions are the only
available legal remedy in the event that human remains are misappropriated or
maltreated.21 The unsettled nature of quasi-property status leaves bodies
vulnerable to un-remedied exploitation. The CDC estimates that roughly 2.8
million Americans die each year.22 Controversies involving the mishandling or
misuse of human remains can arise in a wide variety of circumstances.
Unconsented autopsy, cremation, or tissue harvesting programs all can occur.23
17. Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. 1975) (citations omitted).
18. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, at 63. Prosser & Keeton have stated that, “It seems reasonably
obvious that such ‘property’ is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the
personal feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a lawyer.” Id.
Lon Fuller provided the classic definition of a legal fiction, distinguishable from both lies and erroneous
conclusions. L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 368–69 (1930). According to Fuller, “[a] fiction is
either, (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement
recognized as having utility.” Id. at 369.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
20. It is conceded, as numerous scholars have noted, that adopting property status over quasi-property
status would remove many of the difficulties raised by quasi-property. However, as will be shown, there is
marked hesitancy to do so within the courts. Thus, regardless of one’s opinion about quasi-property, it has real
functional significance.
21. As will be shown, emotional distress and contract law can play a role, but it is quasi-property that most
directly protects human remains. Prior to quasi-property, it has been noted that
[i]n fact, in actions involving dead bodies, the greatest source of difficulties for the courts arose
when they considered the problems of classification and measurement of damages. The root of
these difficulties was once again in the Coke-Blackstone “no property” doctrine. When an
aggrieved survivor sought to bring an action for the mutilation or exhumation of the deceased, he
encountered the defense that wrong had been done to neither his person nor his property, and hence
no cause of action existed.
Richard J. Sidemand & Eric D. Rosenfeld, Legal Aspects of Tissue Donations from Cadavers, 21 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 825, 835 (1970) (citation omitted).
22. Deaths and Mortality, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
23. See NORMAN L. CANTOR, AFTER WE DIE: THE LIFE AND T IMES OF THE HUMAN CADAVER 239–53
(2010). One of the most notorious illicit tissue scandals involved the remains of 244 individuals, including
Masterpiece Theatre host Alistair Cooke. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).
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Funeral homes have been known to mismanage remains through failed
refrigeration or embalming.24 Scandals have erupted over the misuse of remains
by medical school cadaver programs.25 The importance of legal remedies is of
growing importance given the rapidly expanding variety of research and medical
applications for human bodies and parts. The market value for tissues from
deceased donors is worth over $2 billion annually and is growing, and in 2018
450,000 Americans underwent tissue transplantation procedures.26 An
increasing variety of tissues from deceased donors can be transplanted directly
into patients. Deceased donor tissues are necessary and valuable for a wide
variety of medical, scientific, and pharmaceutical research programs. An
investigation into one company, Biological Resource Center (BRC), found that
BRC received over 5000 bodies and distributed over 20,000 body parts over a
nine year period.27 After the company was found to have sold contaminated body
parts, federal agents raided BRC’s facilities.28 The raids revealed over ten tons
of frozen remains in the company’s stock.29 Novel uses for human remains
continue to emerge. Reproductive tissues, such as sperm, can be harvested and
stored from cadavers. In March 2019, for example, the parents of a brain-dead
West Point cadet successfully kept their son’s body connected to life support
until they obtained a court order authorizing sperm retrieval and storage.30

The funeral directors involved harvested bones and tissues from corpses without consent and sold them for
transplantation. Id. at 583–84. In 2003, a scandal erupted over UCLA’s willed body program when it came to
light that staff members personally profited from the illicit sale of corpses donated to the medical school. Andrew
Murr, Inside UCLA’s Cadaver Scandal, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 8, 2007, 7:00 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/
inside-uclas-cadaver-scandal-95785.
24. The distressing situation in which the Lott and Tumminelli families found themselves in 1962 is
illustrative of such an instance of negligence without malice. Lott v. State, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435–36 (Cl. Ct.
1962). Mrs. Lott, an Orthodox Jew, and Mrs. Tumminelli, a Roman Catholic, died at about the same hour in
Brooklyn State Hospital. Id. Unfortunately, the bodies of the two women were mistaken for one another in the
hospital morgue. Id. The result was that Mrs. Lott’s body, in the possession of the Tumminelli funeral director,
was embalmed, made up with cosmetics and placed in a coffin with a crucifix and rosary beads in her hands in
accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic faith, while Mrs. Tumminelli’s body was prepared for an
Orthodox Jewish burial with the requisite preparations and readings from the Torah. Id. For another example of
hospital mismanagement, see Courtney v. St. Joseph Hosp., 500 N.E.2d 703, 703 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (failed
refrigerator prevented an open casket funeral from taking place).
25. See CHRISTINE QUIGLEY, THE CORPSE: A HISTORY 199 (1996). Medical schools have only relatively
recently developed policies to ensure respectful handling and treatment of anatomical corpses. Id. Gallows
humor and practical jokes involving cadavers were once common in medical schools. Id.
26. Global Tissue Banking Market to Surpass US $2.5 Billion by 2026—Coherent Market Insights,
BUSINESSWIRE (June 3, 2019, 8:50 AM) https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190603005330/en/
Global-Tissue-Banking-Market-Surpass-2.5-Billion. See generally CATHERINE WALDBY & ROBERT MITCHELL,
TISSUE ECONOMIES: BLOOD, ORGANS, AND CELL LINES IN LATE CAPITALISM (2006) (surveying the growing
economies in human tissue).
27. John Shiffman, Reade Levinson & Brian Grow, A Business Where Human Bodies Were Butchered,
Packaged and Sold, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-bodies-business/.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Liam Stack, Parents of Dead West Point Cadet Can Use His Sperm, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/nyregion/west-point-cadet-sperm-grandchild.html.
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Finally, although reanimation remains in the realm of science fiction,
cryopreservation has grown in popularity. As of July 2020, Alcor, one of
America’s largest cryonic facilities, had cryopreserved the remains of 180
“patients.”31 Similarly, in March 2018 a Y Combinator startup, Nectome,
promised to preserve, digitize, and reanimate brains.32 These projects are
concerning for many reasons, but one early major concern is the ambiguous
status of the dead bodies these companies will experiment upon and ultimately
offer services “to.”
Quasi-property status also continues to present complications when
America suffers wide scale tragic losses of life. The advancement of genetic
identification technologies enables identification of individuals killed in massive
terrorist attacks or natural disasters. Families’ legal claims to identified remains
are dependent upon recognition of quasi-property rights. Notably, legal disputes
over the treatment of those whose died in the 9/11 terrorist attacks turned on the
application and meaning of quasi-property.33
All of the above circumstances invoke quasi-property status.
Understanding quasi-property is therefore of ever-increasing significance to
modern legal questions surrounding the dead and body parts. Yet, to date, no
one in the literature has fully examined where quasi-property status for human
remains came from, or how and why it was adopted so broadly in the United
States. Before we abolish quasi-property status for human remains, we must
first, I argue, pause and examine where and why we adopted the law in the first
place. This Article aims to remedy the gap in understanding of quasi-property
through two main contributions. First, I show that the academic literature and
case law have misconstrued both the origin of, and reasoning behind quasiproperty status. Scholars and judges mistakenly and repeatedly cite Pierce v.
Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery,34 an 1872 Rhode Island Supreme Court
decision, as the first case to apply quasi-property status to the dead. My research
shows that, in fact, the first case occurred in Cleveland, Ohio, roughly a year
before. My discovery and analysis of the application of quasi-property in this
initial case reframes our understanding of the origin of quasi-property status.
Second, this Article argues against the traditional explanation in the literature
and the case law for the reasoning behind the emergence and widespread
adoption of quasi-property status in the United States. Traditional explanations

31. Alcor Membership Statistics, ALCOR, https://alcor.org/AboutAlcor/membershipstats.html (last visited
Nov. 23, 2020).
32. Antonio Regalado, A Startup Is Pitching a Mind-Uploading Service That Is “100 Percent Fatal”, MIT
TECH. REV. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610456/a-startup-is-pitching-a-minduploading-service-that-is-100-percent-fatal/. Although the company has not, it should be noted, fared
particularly well since. Sharon Begley, After Ghoulish Allegations, a Brain-Preservation Company Seeks
Redemption, STAT (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/01/30/nectome-brain-preservationredemption/.
33. WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529, 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), aff’d sub nom. World Trade Ctr. Families for Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 359 F. App’x 177,
181 (2d Cir. 2009).
34. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 227 (1872).
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in the literature35 and the case law36 point to America’s lack of ecclesiastical
courts, which historically had jurisdiction over cemeteries and burial in England.
But examination reveals that this explanation does not sufficiently account for
the initial application, dominance, or persistence of the unique status of quasiproperty by American courts. This Article advances a novel argument that sociocultural changes forged in the maelstrom of the Civil War precipitated the initial
use and later systematic adoption by American courts of quasi-property status
for human remains. My new discovery and re-examination of the rise of quasiproperty at the turn of the nineteenth century have important ramifications for
how contemporary courts should conceive of this deeply contested legal
category. As mentioned above, increased understanding has consequences for
medical research, emerging biotechnologies, and modern controversies that
arise over human bodily remains. Consequently, historical examination of the
impetuses to its original application can shed new light on contemporary debates
and legal disputes.
This Article is composed of four Parts. The first Part introduces quasiproperty and describes the contemporary legal status and regulation of human
remains in the United States as quasi-property. It includes a brief discussion of
the origins of quasi-property generally. I also introduce a newly discovered case
which predates the traditionally cited first quasi-property status for human
remains case. Section four of the Article includes a deeper analysis of these
cases. To understand the significance of these cases, Part II examines the law of
human remains that preceded quasi-property. This Part focuses on the inherited
British common law of human remains. American states maintained these
inherited laws and principles for roughly one hundred years after independence.
The third Part examines the forces created by the Civil War which to the break
with the inherited common law, and the rise of quasi-property status in the
United States. It broadens to a societal level to argue that the Civil War was a
defining motivation behind the widespread adoption of quasi-property status. It
35. See Balganesh, supra note 8, at 1896–97; R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones: Post-Mortem Markets in
Human Tissue, 26 NOVA L. REV. 421, 425–29 (2002); Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Status of
Body Parts, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 333 (2006); James T.R. Jones, Evidentiary Autopsies, 61 U. COLO. L. REV.
567, 570–71 (1990); Roger S. Magnusson, The Recognition of Proprietary Rights in Human Tissue in Common
Law Jurisdictions, 18 MELB. U. L. REV. 601, 609–10 (1992); James R. Marshall, Testamentary Rights of Bodily
Disposition, 18 LAW NOTES GEN. PRAC. 31, 31–32 (1982); Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead:
Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 925 (1997); Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, Aileen
Maria Marty, & Elena Maria Marty-Nelson, Tears in Heaven: Religiously and Culturally Sensitive Laws for
Preventing the Next Pandemic, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 117, 155 (2016); Andrea Ugaz, Jessica Floyd & Hannah
Wahlen, Freeze a Jolly Good Fellow: Cryonauts and the Law, 11 J. L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 54, 134 (2016).
36. For instance, in Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
During its formative period, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction of the dead; and, in
consonance with the doctrines of that jurisdiction, the common law early rejected the concept of
property in the corpse and the ashes, and treated them as subjects largely of church
superintendency. But the assumption of exclusive jurisdiction by the temporal courts brought
radical changes of theory; and it is now the prevailing rule . . . that the right to bury the dead and
preserve the remains is a quasi right in property . . . .
186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936).
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identifies particularly important societal changes pertaining to death and human
remains produced by the American Civil War. The fourth Part draws from these
identified changes to argue that Americans’ beliefs and expectations regarding
the status and treatment of the dead shifted so dramatically as a result of the Civil
War that the previous system’s failures were rendered unacceptable to
nineteenth century American society and jurists. This Part links back to a more
detailed examination of the early quasi-property cases. My analysis shows that
shifts in beliefs and expectations about the dead occasioned by America’s
experience with the Civil War can be directly linked to fundamental legal
changes that have had a lasting impact on American jurisprudence. Insights
gained from my analysis of the origins of quasi-property have significant
implications for how we should conceive of this deeply misunderstood legal
category.

I. THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL STATUS OF HUMAN REMAINS IN THE
UNITED STATES
A corpse in some respects is the strangest thing on earth. . . . And the law, in
its all-sufficiency, must furnish some rule, by legislative enactment or
analogy, or based on some sound legal principle, by which to determine
between the living questions of the disposition of the dead and rights
surrounding their bodies. —Supreme Court of Georgia, 190537

Under contemporary American law, different human biological materials38
are accorded widely varied legal statuses. One of the greatest distinctions is
property status. Many states classify certain human biological materials, such as
sperm,39 as property. Often there is variation among states, as is the case, for
example, with corneas,40 as to whether a human biological material is, or is not,
legally a property object.41 While different jurisdictions vary regarding the legal
status of many human biological materials, most states are in accord that
deceased human bodies are not objects of legal property. Instead, under
contemporary American law, human remains are quasi-property.42
Quasi-property is an American legal conception composed of limited
interests that mimic some of the functions of property, but does not formally
qualify as property. It is a uniquely American, idiosyncratic and misunderstood
37. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905).
38. As a term, human biological materials is employed expansively to include the “full range of specimens,
from . . . cells, tissues (e.g., blood, bone, muscle, connective tissue, and skin), organs (e.g., liver, bladder, heart,
kidney, and placenta), gametes (i.e., sperm and ova), embryos, fetal tissues, and waste (e.g., hair, nail clippings,
urine, feces, and sweat, which often contains shed skin cells).” NAT’L BIOTHETICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 1–2 (1999).
39. Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 850 (1993).
40. Compare Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002), with Brotherton v.
Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 555 (6th Cir. 1999).
41. “The U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed this question, let alone decided it. The few U.S. Courts of
Appeals that have considered the question have sharply divided.” Shelley v. County of San Joaquin, 954 F. Supp.
2d 999, 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013).
42. See Holland, supra note 16, at 632.
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legal category. Quasi-property is a relatively obscure legal category most
frequently associated with the Supreme Court’s 1918 decision in International
News Services v. Associated Press, Inc, which protected “hot” news information
as quasi-property.43 Despite the association with news, as will be shown below,
many of the earliest and most frequent applications of quasi-property pertain to
human remains. Therefore, human remains form an integral part of
comprehending the entire legal category of quasi-property in American law.44
Given the lack of familiarity with quasi-property, this Part introduces quasiproperty generally, and specifically, to human remains. The following Subparts
provide a brief history of the term, and describe the first application to human
remains.
Quasi-property does not have any of the civil, criminal, or constitutional
implications of property status. Courts are clear that the quasi-property status of
human remains does not give rise to conversion or theft claims, two classic
property remedies.45 Similarly, quasi-property is not covered under the Takings
Clause of the Constitution. Quasi-property status creates difficulties both for
colloquial description of events and lay expectations of justice. If the “hot” news
information is used by a competitor, or bodily remains of an individual are taken,
we cannot technically state that they were stolen, nor can the takers be convicted
of theft. This distinction is particularly confusing because in jurisdictions where,
for example, corneas are property, a bizarre situation may arise wherein an
original illicit taking of an entire human body is not theft, but the later excision
and taking of the corneas from that body, is classified as theft.
Judges apply quasi-property broadly, and often do not provide a concise
definition beyond that it is intended to effectuate the right of sepulcher, namely
the right to bury one’s dead.46 The case law reflects a general sense that quasiproperty in human remains entails limited rights of exclusion, control and
damages. Professor Radhika Rao has provided one of the clearest definitions,
stating that human remains are
characterized as a form of “quasi-property” that c[an] not be bought or sold,
but over which individuals retain[] a limited array of rights, including the right

43. Balganesh, supra note 8, at 1891; see Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
44. Human remains accounted for roughly half (eighteen out of thirty-nine cases) of the quasi-property
cases discoverable in Westlaw that occurred between 1840 and 1910. See O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906 (Cal.
1899); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905); Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644 (1900);
Hockenhammer v. Lexington & E. Ry. Co., 74 S.W. 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903); Koerber v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40
(Wis. 1905); Burney v. Children’s Hosp. in Bos., 47 N.E. 401 (Mass. 1897); Keyes v. Konkel, 78 N.W. 649
(Mich. 1899); Wilson v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 142 S.W. 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912), Litteral v. Litteral, 111
S.W. 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908); Kyles v. S. Ry. Co., 61 S.E. 278 (N.C. 1908); Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471
(App. Div. 1896); In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189 (App. Div. 1891); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery,
10 R.I. 227 (1872). Considering all the other possible subjects and objects, this indicates the strong early
association between quasi-property and human remains. In the contemporary context of the 147 cases that
include quasi-property from 1999 to 2018, 128 of them include keywords of corpse or dead or remains.
45. Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994); R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones:
Post-Mortem Markets in Human Tissue, 26 NOVA L. REV. 421, 427 (2002).
46. Part IV discusses the right of sepulcher in more detail.
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to possess the body for the purposes of burial, the right to control the body’s
use in certain ways, the right to exclude others, and the right to direct the
body’s ultimate disposal.47

Often the legal language of quasi-property mirrors that of the tort of
emotional distress. The causes of action are, however, crucially different. Quasiproperty of human remains focuses on the effect of the defendant’s actions on
the corpse, not on the effect those actions have on the next of kin.48 The
limitations on recovery under emotional distress such as proximity or harm do
not strictly factor into liability under quasi-property. This distinction is one of
the major reasons why recovery under quasi-property can be a plaintiff’s only
avenue for recovery. Quasi-property also serves important functions, like
facilitating the return of remains, which distinguish it from emotional distress.
In short, however, our contemporary understanding of quasi-property is
confused at best. Controversy abounds as to the nature and viability of the
status.49 For this reason, it is essential to examine the origins and motivations
behind the initial application and the wider adoption of quasi-property status.
A. EARLY QUASI-PROPERTY MORE BROADLY
Quasi-property emerged in nineteenth-century America in cases where
traditional features of property rights, such as the right to exclude, were needed,
but judges did not want to recognize broad property rights, or accord property
status. British common law does not recognize quasi-property; it is a product of
the American common law. The decision by judges to create, apply, and
perpetuate quasi-property was a deliberate one. Yet, examination of its origins
in the academic literature remains minimal.50 In describing the Supreme Court’s
decision in International News Services,51 Balganesh noted that “[i]n the years
since the opinion, hardly anyone has attached any significance to Justice Pitney’s
use of the term to describe this peculiar bilateral interest in exclusivity. . . . [But]

47. Rao, supra note 15, at 382–83 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
also nicely articulated the right, stating,
The quasi-property rights of the survivors include the right to custody of the body; to receive
it in the condition in which it was left, without mutilation; to have the body treated with decent
respect, without outrage or indignity thereto; and to bury or otherwise dispose of the body without
interference.
Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 441 (W. Va. 1985).
48. Confusion over this distinction muddies the waters around the meaning of quasi-property. This
confusion, I believe, accounts for much of the criticism that quasi-property is merely a tort of emotional distress,
as Prosser and Keeton argue. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15.
49. Id.; see also Rao, supra note 15, at 363–64.
50. Balganesh, supra note 8, at 1891. Others have noted at most, for example, that “[j]udges were once
prone to sweeping declarations that ‘a dead body is not the subject of property.’ Gradually, however, they began
to soften these statements and describe a decedent’s family as having a ‘quasi-property right in his or her corpse
to ensure its proper handling and burial.’” David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 556 (2014)
(citation omitted).
51. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
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the law’s choice of quasi-property instead of property was both conscious and
analytically significant.”52
Exploring the origins and the early applications of quasi-property by state
courts facilitates appreciation for the nature of quasi-property and enables
greater understanding of the motivations behind later judicial application of the
term to human remains. The first seven discoverable cases discussing quasiproperty occurred between 1844 and 1871.53 All of them involve land, building
materials, or cotton. In 1844, in Casey’s Lessee v. Inloes, the Court of Appeals
for Maryland recognized that the right to extend a lot or one’s wharf into
Baltimore’s Harbor was
a franchise; a vested right, peculiar in its nature; a quasi property, of which
the lessor of the plaintiff could not lawfully be deprived, without her consent.
And if any other person, without her authority, made such extension, no
interest or estate in the improvement vested in the improver, but it became the
property and estate of the owner of the franchise.54

In this case, the court did not recognize the plaintiff as having a full
property right to the land under the navigable water of the harbor.55 Notably,
prior to the construction of a wharf on the land, the quasi-property rights holder
did not have a right to exclude others from boating over the land.56 Instead, the
court utilized quasi-property to accord the plaintiff only two correlated rights to
the submersed land, namely the right to improvements, and the right to exclude
others from making improvements.57
Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court employed quasi-property in the 1850s
to interpret a statute regarding liens on property which stated that,
“Any person who shall, by contract with the owner of any piece of land or
town lot, furnish labor or materials for erecting any building, or the
appurtenance of any building, on such land or town lot, shall have a lien upon
the whole tract or town lot, in the manner herein provided, for the amount due
to him for such labor or materials.”58

In 1857, in Hunter v. Blanchard, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that,
“a quasi property [existed] in those materials, and others with which it has been
commingled in the building . . . for the purpose of getting his pay.”59
Interestingly, in this case, the court employed quasi-property in a manner that

52. Balganesh, supra note 8, at 1891.
53. See Woodruff v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 605, 626 (1871); Kimball v. Jenkins, 11 Fla. 111, 115 (1866);
Patterson v. Gelston, 23 Md. 432, 441 (1865); Gove v. Cather, 23 Ill. 634, 638 (1860); Hunter v. Blanchard, 18
Ill. 318, 324 (1857); Peterkin v. Inloes, 4 Md. 175, 181 (1853); Casey’s Lessee v. Inloes, 1 Gill 430, 501 (Md.
1844).
54. Casey’s Lessee, 1 Gill at 501.
55. Id. at 497.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 501.
58. Hunter, 18 Ill. at 323.
59. Id. at 324.
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did not entail an exclusionary right. Rather, quasi-property in this case can be
reduced to a right to payment.
Unfortunately, the judges in each of these early cases mention the term
almost in passing and do not cite to prior use of quasi-property. Their use,
however, suggests a familiarity with the term. Interestingly, the authors of each
of the opinions were well-trained and established members of the bench serving
on higher-level courts.60 For example, Judge Dorsey, the author of the Casey’s
Lessee61 opinion, was a respected member of the Maryland bench, who had
served as Attorney General for the state and as a United States District
Attorney.62 Consequently, it does not appear that quasi-property during this
early period was the product of a rogue lower court judge.
Establishing the originator of quasi-property as a general concept is
unfortunately outside the scope of this project, and one that, as of yet, remains a
mystery. It is, however, very likely that the originator was motivated by a desire
to mirror the more established concept of quasi-contract. Writing on the history
of quasi-contract, legal scholar Harold Hazeltine noted that
the courts of common law in medieval and early modern periods found… no
theoretical guidance in the books at their disposal; and, as a result, they were
compelled to develop in their own empirical way the law in respect to various
miscellaneous obligations which came to be known, in later times,
as . . . “quasi-contracts.” The judges developed the law in regard to these
obligations, a law that was slowly emerging as something in the nature of an
addendum to the law of contracts and torts.63

Quasi-property, both in the past and now, serves a comparable legal
function to quasi-contract. Quasi-contract is a means of providing a legal
substitute for enforcing legal, and arguably moral, obligations where a legal
contract is technically lacking.64 Quasi-contract allows judges to protect
expectations and ensure equitable outcomes. Similarly, quasi-property provides
a legal substitute for recognizing particularly limited rights that mimic many of
the functions of property. Quasi-property allows the court to not recognize a
complete set of incidents of ownership,65 or a finding of an in rem right that
could be entailed by a holding of property status. Yet, it also protects citizens’
rights and interests that might otherwise not be afforded legal protection. It
cannot be asserted with certainty, but given the similarity between the etymology
60. Use by lower court judges may have occurred but those opinions may not have been preserved for
posterity or digitized.
61. Casey’s Lessee, 1 Gill at 486.
62. CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY 122 (1928).
63. Harold Hazeltine, Editors Introduction, in R.M. JACKSON, THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN
ENGLISH LAW, at x (1936). Quasi-contract has a pedigree dating from Roman and then English law. R.M.
Jackson notes that the term has been in use in English courts since the eighteenth century. Early instances of the
term include Speake v. Richards, (1618) Hob. 206, pl.260, and Mayor of London v. Gorry, (1676) 3 Keb. 677.
Id. at 127 n.2. For a more contemporary case, see Clay v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa Cnty., 935 P.2d 294
(Okla. 1997).
64. Timothy J. Sullivan, The Concept of Benefit in the Law of Quasi-Contract, 64 GEO. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1975).
65. See TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BIND (1987).
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and the function, it is very likely that quasi-property was developed by judges
seeking to emulate some of the features of the more established quasi-contract.
B. THE RISE OF QUASI-PROPERTY STATUS FOR HUMAN REMAINS
Despite the range of early applications discussed above, in the
contemporary context, quasi-property is applied almost exclusively to two
categories: intellectual property-type circumstances66 and human remains. This
Article focuses on applications involving human remains. Application to human
remains was the earliest systemic usage of quasi-property, and it continues to
this day.67
The existing literature and case law assert that the first case to apply quasiproperty to human remains was in 1872 in Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point
Cemetery.68 The case centered on a dispute that arose over the remains of

66. Contemporary use in intellectual property contexts began with the Supreme Court’s 1918 International
News Service v. Associated Press decision. 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). Justice Pitney’s introduction of quasiproperty status almost seems to spring from thin air. See id. In the opinion, he made no mention as to the source
or his inspiration for the novel term. Id. at 236–37. To date, no scholars have sought to identify the source of his
adoption of the term. I propose that there is a good chance that human remains law was the source of his
inspiration to use the term. Pitney, did, however have a background in both state law and equity. Mahlon Pitney,
1912–1922, SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, https://supremecourthistory.org/timeline_pitney.html (last
visited Nov. 23, 2020). Before being appointed to the Supreme Court, he served on the New Jersey Supreme
Court and as Chancellor of New Jersey. Id. As Chancellor, he presided over both the law and equity branches of
the Court from 1908–1912. Id. Intriguingly, the only New Jersey quasi-property case before 1918 is a 1911 case
involving parents disputing over the burial location of their deceased child. De Festetics v. De Festetics, 81 A.
741, 741–42 (N.J. Ch. 1911). In the opinion, the Chancery Court of New Jersey grappled with whether they had
jurisdiction over the case, something which, as will be shown, is a common feature of early human remains case
law. See id. The opinion mentions the Pierce case with approval and directly cites the proposition that bodily
remains are quasi-property. Id. at 742 (citing Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242
(1872)). In addition to occurring in New Jersey under Pitney’s tenure, this case was detailed on the front page
of the New York Times. Court to Supervise Burial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1911, at A1. There is, at least,
circumstantial evidence that Pitney’s awareness of quasi-property originated from human remains law.
67. Balganesh, supra note 8, at 1895–97.
68. For cases, see Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 792 (9th Cir. 2002); O’Donnell v. Slack,
55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899); Wales v. Wales, 190 A. 109, 110 (Del. Ch. 1936); Keyes v. Konkel, 78 N.W. 649,
649 (Mich. 1899); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 26 (Ga. 1905); Burney v. Children’s Hosp. in
Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897); Melfi v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 877 N.Y.S.2d 300, 307 (App. Div. 2009);
State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 662 (R.I. 2004); Sullivan v. Cath. Cemeteries, Inc., A.2d 430, 432 (R.I. 1974);
Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 441 (W. Va. 1985). For literature, see ROHAN
HARDCASTLE, LAW AND THE HUMAN BODY: PROPERTY RIGHTS, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 51 (2007); DANIEL
SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: L EGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 101 (2008); Edward Halealoha Ayau,
Restoring the Ancestral Foundation of Native Hawaiians: Implementation of the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 204 (1992); Ilene S. Cooper & Robert M. Harper, Life
After Death: The Authority of Estate Fiduciaries to Dispose of Decedents’ Reproductive Matter, 26 TOURO L.
REV. 649, 652 (2010); Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 229 (1996);
Goodwin, supra note 35, at 370; Holland, supra note 16, at 632; Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human
Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 170 (2000); Susan R. Martyn, Using the Brain Dead for Medical Research, 1986
UTAH L. REV 1, 10 (1986); Lisa Milot, What Are We—Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The Tax Treatment
of Transfers of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1083 (2010); Anne Reichman Schiff,
Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 925, 947 (1997).
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Whiting Metcalf.69 Mr. Metcalf died in 1856.70 He left behind a daughter, and
heir at law, Almira Pierce, and a widow, Almira Metcalf.71 Mr. Metcalf was
interred in a burial plot, which he had purchased during his lifetime.72 The plot
was located in the Unitarian section of the Swan Point Cemetery.73 Mr. Metcalf
was a prominent member of the Unitarian church during his lifetime, and the
particular plot was grouped together with plots that were assigned to other
members of Mr. Metcalf’s family.74 Thirteen years after his death, Mrs. Metcalf
disinterred and moved the remains to a plot located in a different section, and
likely different religious denomination, of the same cemetery.75 The daughter
objected to the change and sued to have her father’s remains reinterred in the
original plot.76 The widow’s counsel argued that because dead bodies are not
property under the law, the court had no jurisdiction, and therefore could not
legally mandate the return of the remains.77 The only cause of action that was
available, they argued, was one of trespass, with damage awardable for the
intrusion upon the land of the burial plot, which was owned by the daughter.78
As will be shown in the following sections, the defendant’s counsel was not
incorrect in their reading of the state of American law at the turn of the
nineteenth century. Instead, the court issued a radical holding. Judge Potter,
writing for the Rhode Island Supreme Court, held
[t]hat there is no right of property in a dead body, using the word in its ordinary
sense, may well be admitted. Yet the burial of the dead is a subject which
interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters
of actual property. . . . it may therefore be considered as a sort of quasi
property, and it would be discreditable to any system of law not to provide a
remedy in such a case. . . . And a sort of right of custody over, or interest in,
the dead body, in the relatives of the deceased, is recognized in the statutes of
many of our states. . . . we may consider [the body] as a sort of quasi property,
to which certain persons may have rights, as they have duties to
perform towards it arising out of our common humanity. But the person

69. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227–28 (1872).
70. Id. at 228.
71. Id. at 227–28. Confusingly, both women were named Almira. See id. The relationship between the two
women is not entirely clear as to whether the senior Almira was a mother or stepmother to the junior Almira. Id.
at 228. These types of situations suggest that they were not linked by blood, but the similarity of names suggests
otherwise. My best guess is that the mother experienced some form of radical religious conversion which severed
her relationship with her daughter.
72. Id. at 228.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. More accurately the daughter, Almira F. Pierce, and her husband, William G. Pierce, sued. Id. at 227–
28. The case was originally cited as William G. Pierce & wife vs. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery & Almira
T. Metcalf. It also appears that the widow converted religions, and a large part of the dispute was the removal of
the remains from the Unitarian section to a section of plots affiliated with a different religious sect. Id. at 228–
29.
77. Id. at 231–32.
78. Id. at 232, 242.
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having charge of it cannot be considered as the owner of it in any sense
whatever; he holds it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may from
family or friendship, have an interest in it . . . .79

Establishing quasi-property status enabled the court to then assert
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and issue a ruling for the return
of the remains to the original plot. There is no doubt that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court’s ruling was radical at the time and has had a lasting impact on
American law. Yet, it was not, I argue, as revolutionary as traditionally thought.
My research reveals that a case which was widely reported at the time, but
subsequently forgotten, predated Pierce, and is most likely the first case to
ascribe quasi-property status to bodily remains. On June 27, 1871, Judge Prentiss
of the Cuyahoga court of common pleas held that, “[a] body itself may not be
property; but this right may be called perhaps a quasi property [right].”80 The
suit was brought by a widower, John Thilman.81 His wife’s remains were
entrusted to a local medical college for the purposes of determining the cause of
death.82 It was subsequently discovered that the college retained the remains and
instead returned a nailed-shut coffin filled with “timbers, straw and carpet” for
burial.83 The full details of the case are discussed in Part IV. As readers will
come to understand after reading Part II, the application of quasi-property to
human remains in the case was crucial for Judge Prentiss, as it was for the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, to render a decision in favor of the widower plaintiff. At
this point in the Article, only the time frame, novelty of the decision’s use of
quasi-property, and subsequent publicity of the opinion will be discussed.
The original text of the 1871 opinion does not appear to have survived.84
Yet, the initial incident involving the expropriation of the decedents remains85
and subsequent legal actions86 were reported extensively in regional
newspapers. More importantly, the plaintiff’s lawyers directly submitted a report
of the case to American Law Times. The editor notes that the case “is probably
entirely without precedent, and . . . is likely to open the way to the establishment
79. Id. at 237–43 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Close reading of the opinion, however, suggests
that while Judge Potter felt his ruling was novel, he did not think it was unprecedented. The sentence that
precedes the famous passage above notes that, “[t]he question [of the civil law status of the dead] is new in this
state; and we do not know that it has ever occurred in our mother country, and but seldom in the United States.”
Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
80. “That Singular Proceeding.” The Right of a Corpse to Decent Treatment and Burial—The Case
Against the Women’s Medical College, PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), June 27, 1870; see also 4 AMERICAN LAW TIMES
127 (Rowland Cox ed., 1871) (subsequently reported in Summary of Events, 6 AM. L. REV. 153, 182 (1871)).
81. Seeking for Justice, PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), Dec. 27, 1870 (reporting that Thilman arrived in Ohio with
intent to sue).
82. Sequel to “A Singular Proceeding.”, PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), Nov. 19, 1870.
83. Id.
84. Communication with Judy Cetina, Cnty. Archivist, Cuyahoga Cnty. Archives (Dec. 18, 2018) (on file
with author).
85. A Singular Proceeding, PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), Nov. 10, 1870; Sequel to “A Singular Proceeding”,
supra note 82; Another Letter from Mr. Thilman, PLAIN DEALER (Ohio), Dec. 10, 1870; Seeking for Justice,
supra note 81.
86. “That Singular Proceeding.”, supra note 80.
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of doctrines of the greatest consequence.”87 After outlining the case the editor
goes further in expressing their enthusiasm for this legal development and the
novelty of the case, stating that,
We take this occasion to express our sincere sense of obligation to the
gentlemen who have furnished us with the report in this case, and others who
have been equally courteous. When we shall have reached a period when the
bar of the whole country shall direct our efforts, and, by co-operating with us,
make our work the means of circulating the new precedents which are
constantly springing up in every section, we shall have attained the full
measure of our growth. The days when the editor in his gloomy sanctum edited
the successful journal have passed. The growing intelligence of the people
demanded a more enlarged system, and we now find that our great papers are
really edited by representatives in every quarter of the globe. Some such plan
must be devised in the world of legal journalism if it is hoped to fully meet
the advanced demands of the age. There must be authenticity, conservatism,
substantial merit, but there must also be modern life, and modern
practicability. What we want to accomplish is to give our readers that which
is new, and at the same time that which will prove of permanent value. We
ask only their co-operation to make our work the most useful and interesting
publication which it is possible for the American bench and bar to enjoy.88

The accompanying text makes strikingly clear how pathbreaking the editor
of one of the major American legal publications of the time considered the case.
Contemporary editors of other legal publications agreed, and soon many
republished the case in their own journals.89 For example, the October 1871 issue
of the American Law Review stated above their reprinting of the Thilman90 case,
“[w]e find in the American Law Times, for July, a report of a case which is
probably entirely without precedent.”91 The Albany Law Journal of August 1871
noted that “[a] most extraordinary case has lately been tried in Cincinnati.”92
Significantly, close reading of the text accompanying Pierce93 suggests that
it was Prentiss’ opinion which motivated the application of quasi-property by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The plaintiffs’ counsel in Pierce relied upon
Prentiss’ decision to ground their argument for jurisdiction and relief. They cited
87. AMERICAN LAW TIMES, supra note 80, at 127.
88. Id. at 129.
89. 3 LEGAL GAZETTE 260 (Philadelphia, King & Baird 1871); Remedy for Injury to Dead Body., 3 CHI.
LEGAL NEWS 378 (Chicago, Chi. Legal News Co. 1871).
90. For ease of discussion, I have termed the case Thilman. The original case name is no longer
discoverable. The law reports do not list the plaintiff nor the defendant’s names, but from newspaper clippings
I was able to discover the names of the various parties. No record of the case survives however, so a full citation
is not possible.
91. Summary of Events, 6 AM. L. REV. 153, 182 (1871). An 1877 issue of the American Law Register
discussed the Thilman case (however it only mentioned Prentiss and the American Law Times). Lowry v. Plitts,
25 AM. L. REG. 148, 161–62 (1877). The article notes it as a remarkable case and lists it as predating Pierce. Id.
92. Property in Human Bodies, 4 ALB. L.J. 1, 56 (1871). This is a typo within the article. It should state
“Cleveland.”
93. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237–38 (1872). The Rhode Island Supreme
Court’s published case includes arguments made by both the plaintiff’s and the defendants’ counsel. Id.
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to the American Law Times republication of Thilman, made numerous references
to the “law of Ohio,”94 and asked the court to “adopt and declare as the law of
burial in Rhode Island, the law which has thus been declared and affirmed [in
other states].”95 The record also shows that the plaintiffs’ counsel in Pierce
explicitly advanced the language of quasi-property, likely drawn from their
reading of the report on Thilman, as applicable to human remains.96 Thus, while
the 1872 Pierce case is traditionally cited as the first quasi-property in human
remains case, my research demonstrates that in fact the 1871 Thilman case was
the progenitor of the status. As will be discussed in the following Parts, once
applied, use of quasi-property grew rapidly across the United States.97
Identification of the first case is significant because it establishes a timeline
for the introduction of this revolutionary legal status. My research shows that
while the traditional account that dates quasi-property in human remains to 1872
is incorrect, it is, as a I show, also only off by a year. This timeline is significant
because it validates a mystery about human remains law in America. As will be
shown, the inherited English law was ineffective, and obviously so. Yet, it was
maintained for hundreds of years. The question that remains unanswered, and
prompted this paper, is why did courts finally reject a grossly inadequate legal
system and introduce quasi-property status of human remains only after the
1870s?
As was shown, quasi-property originally developed in America in cases
involving diverse subjects. The early applications of quasi-property are
significant because there is no evidence that quasi-property originated in burial
or human remains law, nor had it ever been applied to human remains before the
1870s. What motivated these judges to adopt such an obscure legal status at that
particular moment in time? Surprise about the rise of quasi-property status is
94. Id. at 235.
95. Id.
96. The record does not indicate the positive argument that the remains were the quasi-property of the
daughter, although this was likely such an argument that was advanced. The record does contain the additional
argument by counsel that the “body of Whiting Metcalf, deceased, belonged to his only child and next of kin as
property, and she had the right to dispose of it as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which disposition
of other property may be regulated.” Id. at 233. Rather, the only mention of quasi-property by the plaintiffs’
counsel that was recorded is their argument that “the respondent Almira T. Metcalf, the widow of Whiting
Metcalf, had no right of property or of quasi property in, or control over, the remains of her dead husband.” Id.
at 234.
97. See Rao, supra note 15, at 446–56 (providing an excellent overview of the status of human bodies and
parts in American law). Quasi-property remains the dominant understanding for most body and parts in
contemporary America. Id.; see also Pierce v. Proprietors, 10 R.I. at 238; Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,
335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985); Wilson v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 142 S.W. 775, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912);
Litteral v. Litteral, 111 S.W. 872, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908); Kyles v. S. Ry. Co., 61 S.E. 278, 280 (N.C. 1908);
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 26 (Ga. 1905); Koerber v. Patek, 102 N.W. 40, 42 (Wis. 1905);
Hockenhammer v. Lexington & E. Ry. Co., 74 S.W. 222, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903); Brown v. Maplewood
Cemetery Ass’n, 89 N.W. 872, 879 (Minn. 1902); Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644, 650 (1901); Keyes v.
Konkel, 78 N.W. 649, 649 (Mich. 1899); O’Donnell v. Slack, 55 P. 906, 907 (Cal. 1899), Burney v. Children’s
Hosp. in Bos., 47 N.E. 401, 402 (Mass. 1897); Foley v. Phelps, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 473 (App. Div. 1896); Hackett
v. Hackett, 26 A. 42, 43 (R.I. 1893); In re Donn, 14 N.Y.S. 189 (App. Div. 1891); Griffith v. Charlotte, C. &
A.R. Co., 23 S.C. 25, 41 (1885).
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heightened because it upended hundreds of years of inherited British common
law. The Thilman and Pierce courts not only applied a novel status, but in doing
so, they rejected inherited common law. Adoption of quasi-property was a
radical shift. It required judges to claim jurisdiction and reject the no property
rule, both of which were ordained by the likes of Edward Coke and William
Blackstone. American judges at the turn of the nineteenth century asserted
jurisdiction over human remains and rejected the traditional holding that human
remains had no legal status because they were not objects of legal property. Why
were these inherited legal principles that had been maintained for hundreds of
years after independence suddenly untenable to nineteenth century American
judges? The traditional explanation for America’s break with the inherited
common law and adoption of quasi-property holds that the status emerged in
reaction to America’s lack of ecclesiastical courts. However, as will be shown
in the following Parts, this explanation does not survive scrutiny. America never
established ecclesiastical courts, even during the colonial period; therefore,
something else must account for the shift in American law in the 1870s. To begin
to understand the nature and import of these changes, the next Part introduces
and examines the inherited common law.

II. THE LEGAL STATUS AND REGULATION OF HUMAN REMAINS IN
BRITAIN AND EARLY AMERICA
In Britain at the time of the American Revolution, ecclesiastical courts had
jurisdiction over cemeteries, burial, and human remains.98 The Church operated
ecclesiastical courts independently from the civil courts. Consequently, before
the dissolution of the ecclesiastical courts in 1860,99 British common law and
equity courts technically lacked any authority to adjudicate matters involving
control over, or the treatment of, human remains. The bar on secular judicial
authority relaxed somewhat in 1841 in R. v. Fox.100 In Fox, the court commanded
the release of a body to the executors being held by a gaoler (jailer) who refused
to release the body of the imprisoned decedent until the executors repaid a loan
he had made to the decedent.101 The court reasons that because legislation placed
a duty on executors to bury the corpse, a correlated right to possess the corpse
for the limited purpose of burial existed.102 The right, however, disappeared

98. See Frank W. Grinnell, Legal Rights in the Remains of the Dead, 17 GREEN B AG 345, 349 (1905).
Despite the official ecclesiastical control over matters pertaining to burial, individuals and kin maintained some
authority over burial. Id. at 346, 349–51. Long before Jeremy Bentham bequeathed his body for dissection,
individuals included directions for the disposition of their remains. Id. at 345. For instance, in 1397 John of
Gaunt directed that his body be buried in St. Paul’s Cathedral. Id. While the relative legal validity of requests is
debatable, custom has dictated that such requests are generally honored. Moreover, the right to possess and/or a
duty to bury of kin gained recognition. Id. at 346.
99. See R. B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE E NGLISH ECCESIASTICAL COURTS, 1500-1860, AT
168–73 (2006).
100. R. v. Fox (1841) 114 Eng. Rep. 95, 96 (Q.B.).
101. Id.
102. Id. Mark Pawlowski has noted that:
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upon burial. The court did not extend its jurisdiction or an individual’s right to
possess to buried remains, even if those remains were subsequently
disinterred.103
The general lack of jurisdiction over human remains contributed to the
British common law holding that secular courts would not recognize property
rights in human remains. The holding, known as the no-property rule, has a long
and pedigreed legal history. Sir Edward Coke in 1644 in his foundational
common law treatise, Institutes of the Lawes of England, stated that, “the buriall
of the Cadeaver . . . is nullius in bonis,” or the goods of no one.104 While the
legal precedent supporting Coke’s original assertion of the no-property rule have
been called into question by twentieth century commentators,105 those who
followed after Coke adopted and perpetuated the rule, such that it became a
guiding principle of current British common law. For example, Andrew Grubb,
a British legal academic, has noted that subsequent courts, “took Coke at his
word, often literally repeating his account such that the common law has come
to accept, albeit largely though obiter dicta, that, buried or not, and rightly or
wrongly, the dead human body is the subject to this so-called ‘no-property’
rule.”106 Drawing from Coke, in 1766 William Blackstone maintained the
holding that at common law there could be no property in human remains, stating
that, “stealing the corpse itself, which has no owner, (though a matter of great
indecency) is no felony, unless some of the gravecloths be stolen with it.”107 The
no-property rule was upheld not only in legal writing, but also in British case
law. For example, in the 1788 case R. v. Lynn, the court relied upon Blackstone’s
determination and upheld the no-property rule.108
The no-property rule became enshrined in British law and persisted after
the dissolution of the ecclesiastical courts in 1860. In 1882, in Williams v.
Williams, the court recognized and upheld the no-property rule.109 Furthermore,
in 1883, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his work History of the Criminal Law,
wrote, “[t]he dead body of a human being is almost the only moveable object

[t]he right to possession for the purpose of burial emanates from the common law when it began
to assume jurisdiction over religious offences from the ecclesiastical courts. Although the principle
that there was no property in a body was maintained, the person who was charged with the duty of
disposing of the body had the limited right to possess it until burial.
Mark Pawlowski, Property in Body Parts and Products of the Human Body, 30 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 35, 38
(2009); see also Magnusson, supra note 35, at 608; Sharp v. Lush (1879), 10 Ch. D. 468.
103. R. v. Fox, 114 Eng. Rep. at 246–47.
104. 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 203 (W. Clarke, & Sons 1809) (1644).
105. See Skegg, supra note 3, at 412. Coke attributed the assertion to a thirteenth-century work, Britton. Id.
Interestingly, later readings of Britton have found nothing in the work that establishes Coke’s nullius in bonis
proposition. Id.
106. Andrew Grubb, ‘I, Me, Mine’: Bodies, Parts, and Property, 3 MED. L. INT’L 299, 307 (1998).
107. BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *236.
108. R. v. Lynn (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 394, 395 (K.B.).
109. Williams v. Williams (1882) 20 Ch. D. 659; see also Skegg, supra note 3, at 415–16.
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known to me which by our law is no one’s property, and cannot, so long at all
events it exists as such, become the property of any one.”110
Consequently, the British common law system entailed a lack of
jurisdiction and a no-property rule. In and of themselves these two principles are
not necessarily inherently problematic if paired with substantive criminal or
regulatory laws. In practice, at the time, they produced a system that created a
legal vacuum around human remains, particularly in the United States wherein
ecclesiastical courts had never been established. To understand the effect of
these two principles, the next Subpart highlights the example of grave robbing
to demonstrate the limited legal recourse individuals had if the buried remains
of their kin were negligently treated, lost or taken.
A. THE IMPACT OF THE LACK OF JURISDICTION AND THE NO-PROPERTY RULE
The lack of jurisdiction by common law courts effectively hamstrung their
ability to intervene in most matters involving human remains. Moreover,
because of the no-property rule, even if a judge wanted to intervene the most
common legal mechanisms for protecting and recovering physical objects under
property law were unavailable. Most notably, the ability to legally exclude,
demand return or recover damages through conversion or theft all depend upon
the property status of the object. For instance, in 1788, in R v. Lynn, a British
court held that, because of the no-property rule, an individual who had illicitly
taken a corpse could not be indicted for theft.111
Common law jurisdiction and property status are not, it should be noted,
the only possible mechanism for legally recognizing the legitimate moral and
social interests that next of kin have in the treatment and protection of human
remains. The impact of both these principles was dramatically magnified by the
fact that courts and the legislative branches in Britain and America were very
slow to pass substantive legislation to protect human remains through criminal
and regulatory laws. These two common law holdings were therefore significant
during this time precisely because comparable criminal laws were either nonexistent, not pursued by the state, or toothless.112
The most glaring example of the dangerous consequences of the lack of
private enforcement and effective comparable criminal law is the example of
dissection and grave robbing. Even though dissection became widely practiced
in England after the Renaissance, it was not until the 1832 Anatomy Act that
Britain developed substantive regulation of dissection to curtail the practice of
grave robbing.113 Without legal access to corpses and limited consequences, the
110. STEPHEN, supra note 1.
111. R. v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. at 395.
112. R. v. Lynn occurred in the midst of the American Revolutionary War, and there is no evidence that the
case was later incorporated into American common law. I came across it mentioned in one law review article
from 1885, although it is miss-cited as Rex v. Lyon. Francis King Carey, The Disposition of the Body After
Death, 19 AM. L. REV. 251, 260 (1885).
113. RUTH RICHARDSON, DEATH, DISSECTION AND THE DESTITUTE 32–36 (2000). Earlier attempts at
regulating dissection focused on the provision of bodies. In 1540, Henry VIII granted the guild of barbers and
surgeons the right to the bodies of four executed criminals each year. Id. at 32. Charles II increased the
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pilfering of graves to acquire corpses for dissection proliferated. This situation
existed in the colonies and persisted past independence in the United States.
Congress in 1790 enacted a provision whereby murderers could be additionally
sentenced by federal judges with dissection,114 and many states passed similar
legislation to apply to their state courts. This law mirrored earlier British laws.115
Massachusetts, for instance, had legislation in place permitting state judges to
make executed corpses available for dissection, but between 1800 and 1830 only
forty criminals were executed.116 As in England, these measures proved
insufficient to fulfill demand in America. Harvard Medical School was, for
example, founded in 1782, and in 1815 seventy-five students matriculated.117
Dissection was a key part of the medical curriculum at that time. Forty bodies
would have been barely sufficient for the class of 1815 students, let alone the
students over the entire thirty-year period. Due to the inability to procure corpses
legally, grave robbing was a recurring problem in the United States.
Before independence, criminal provisions in the United Kingdom and the
American colonies against grave robbing were nonexistent. In the most
comprehensive article on the matter, Frederick Waite noted that only two laws
were “enacted in any of the colonies of New England which may be a prohibition
of disinterment of human bodies.”118 The first was passed in 1655 in Rhode
Island, but the text and light punishment suggest that the law was intended to
refer to grave goods or burial markers.119 The second was passed in 1692 in
Massachusetts, just around the time of the Salem witch trials.120 The law was
“An Act against Conjurgation, Witchcraft, and Dealing with Evil and Wicked
Spirits,” and included a provision that anyone who took bodies or body parts for
the purpose of witchcraft “shall suffer death.”121 Although this law entailed the
more serious punishment of capital punishment, it was limited in scope to
witchcraft. Moreover, the law was invalidated by English courts on technical
reasons shortly after.122
Criminal provisions against grave robbing did not emerge in the United
Kingdom until 1788, during the course of the American Revolutionary War. In

entitlement to six bodies per year, and the 1752 Murder Act further assisted availability by enabling judicial
discretion in levying dissection as an additional punishment for murderers. Id. at 36.
114. MICHAEL SAPPOL, A TRAFFIC OF DEAD BODIES: ANATOMY AND E MBODIED SOCIAL IDENTITY IN
NINETEENTH -CENTURY AMERICA 123 (2002).
115. See RICHARDSON, supra note 113, at 32–36.
116. David C. Humphrey, Dissection and Discrimination: The Social Origins of Cadavers in America,
1760–1915, 49 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 819, 819–20 (1973).
117. The School on Mason Street, CTR. FOR THE HIST. OF MED., COUNTWAY LIBR. OF MED.,
https://collections.countway.harvard.edu/onview/exhibits/show/broad-foundation/the-school-on-mason-street
(last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
118. Frederick C. Waite, Grave Robbing in New England, 33 BULL. OF THE MED. LIBR. ASS’N 272, 273
(1945).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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the case mentioned above, R v. Lynn, while the court upheld the no property rule,
it still broke with common law precedent and held that grave robbing was an
offense punishable as a misdemeanor.123 Thereafter, British judges relied upon
the ruling of Lynn to uphold grave robbing as a misdemeanor, typically
classifying it as an offense against public decency. Offenses against public
decency, however, carried a light sentence, most often in the form of fines. This
led to the surprising rule that grave robbing in the United Kingdom was a “crime
punishable by fine and imprisonment . . . [whereas the theft of] . . . the dead
body of a sheep, or pig, or calf, or an ox, or fowl of any sort, is a capital felony,
punished with death.”124
After independence, some American states began to pass laws outlawing
grave robbing. Often these laws coincided with the opening of a medical school.
Waite notes that “[t]he authorities of Dartmouth college announced in the spring
of 1796 that they proposed to inaugurate institutional teaching in medicine. The
General Assembly of New Hampshire in June of that year enacted the first
statute in the state regarding grave robbing. . . . in 1804, the assembly of
[Vermont, one mile away from Dartmouth] enacted a [similar] statute.”125 These
statutes entailed a “fine not to exceed $1,000, imprisonment not to exceed one
year, and public whipping not to exceed thirty-nine stripes.”126 Yet, in general,
laws prohibiting grave robbing lagged behind the establishment of medical
schools. Massachusetts, despite having the nation’s third medical school,
Harvard, did not enact a law criminalizing grave robbing until 1820.127
There are a few illustrative examples of convictions that occurred under
these laws. In 1897, the Court of Appeals of Kansas upheld the conviction of
Martin E. Lowe for removing a body from a grave with the intention to sell
“contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace
and dignity of the state of Kansas.”128 In a 1900 Tennessee case, Thompson v.
State, E.D. Thompson, the County Undertaker, and Frank Thompson were
convicted for attempting to sell for $50 the body of a pauper, Jennie McGuire,
which was entrusted to them for burial.129 They were each punished with a fine
of “$750 and imprisonment in the county workhouse for the period of 11 months
and 29 days.”130 Yet, even in states where criminal provisions did exist, it is
123. R. v. Lynn (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 394, 395 (K.B.).
124. William Cobbett, To the Working People on the New Dead-Body Bill, COBBETT’S WKLY. POL. REG.,
Jan. 28, 1832, at 1. Despite the technical provisions of the law, commentators have noted that,
[a]s the incidence of disturbances [of graves] grew, local magistrates, eager to keep the peace, paid
more attention to popular feelings and handed out harsher sentences. In 1824 at the Essex Assizes
a resurrectionist who was found in possession of a clothed body was sentenced to seven years
transportation for stealing burial clothing.
John Knott, Popular Attitudes to Death and Dissection in Early Nineteenth Century Britain: The Anatomy
Act and the Poor, 49 LAB. HIST. 1, 5 (1985).
125. Waite, supra note 118, at 274.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. State v. Lowe, 50 P. 912, 912 (Kan. Ct. App. 1897).
129. Thompson v. State, 58 S.W. 213, 213–14 (Tenn. 1900).
130. Id. at 213.

316

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:291

difficult to find cases that resulted in convictions. Waite’s review of all of the
criminal reports for Vermont between 1820 and 1840 is demonstrative and worth
citing in full.
[O]nly seven indictments for the felony of “disinterring the body of the dead.”
These involved four disinterments and five offenders. One indicted person
was never brought to trial. Two men, indicted for a single disinterment, were
acquitted at a jury trial. . . . In these twenty years one, two, or three medical
colleges were in operation in Vermont and graduated 792 men in course. They
were attended by a larger number of students who were not
graduated . . . making over 1,600 [students] . . . . It is fair to estimate that
[these students] used at least 400 cadavers. The provision for legal acquisition
of cadavers furnished only a negligible number at this time, one or two a
year.131

Some disinterment went undetected, but grave robbing was a practice to
which individuals and authorities often intentionally turned a blind eye,
particularly with regards to graveyards known as potter’s fields, where bodies
were buried at public expense.132 One particularly poignant example of this
occurred in 1845 in Philadelphia.133 The inmates of the local almshouse
petitioned the board to prevent the robbing of bodies from the almshouse
graveyard.134 The board replied that, “‘the [medical] colleges must have
subjects’ and should grave robbers be barred from the almshouse they would
plunder church cemeteries and other private burial grounds.”135 Americans of all
classes adopted various measures such as patented metal coffins to protect their
dead against the “ravages of t[h]e dissecting knife,”136 but the poor had few
political, social and economic resources to protect their dead. Thus, most corpses
used for medical purposes came from the poor or the unknown dead. The
graveyards of the almshouses and poorer areas were particularly frequent targets
of body snatchers.137
The social stratification of body snatching also occurred in England, but
American grave robbing was racially stratified. Prior to the Civil War, slave
owners could sell or give slaves to researchers or medical schools for
experiments or dissection.138 Given the value of a living slave at the time, it was
very unlikely anyone would have been sold and killed for dissection, but it was
131. Waite, supra note 118, at 275–76.
132. Id. at 279.
133. Humphrey, supra note 116, at 819.
134. Id.
135. Id. It should be noted however, the life of a grave robber was far from easy. As detailed in Dr. Frederick
Waite’s article, great care was taken to avoid detection, including replacing any decorative arrangement placed
on top of the fresh grave. Waite, supra note 118, at 280.
136. Fisk’s Patent Metallic Burial Cases (illustration), in GARY LADERMAN, THE SACRED REMAINS:
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH, 1799–1883 (1996), following p. 116.
137. Humphrey, supra note 116, at 821.
138. HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION ON B LACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 54–55, 103–04 (2006).
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certainly the case that African Americans, particularly in the South, were
mainstays of dissection halls even after emancipation. In 1835, for example, one
traveler commented on how, “‘[i]n Baltimore the bodies of coloured people are
exclusively taken for dissection.’”139 Additionally, between 1834 and 1852, the
faculty of the Medical College of Georgia hired slaves to “act as intermediaries
in the purchase of bodies from masters in the surrounding plantation country.”140
Further north, where there were fewer African Americans, some medical schools
went so far as to make arrangements for bodies, hidden in barrels, to be shipped
from the South.141 Overrepresentation of African Americans continued into the
post-Civil War era, when Black cemeteries were far more frequently targeted
for raiding than white cemeteries.142
Consequently, these criminal statutes did little to curtail the practice or
protect remains. Until the turn of the twentieth century, grave robbing was a
legitimate concern for all members of American society, particularly for the
poorer classes. Even though states passed laws criminalizing grave robbing, the
statutes were typically weak, ineffective, and unenforced.143 Notably, while in
practice a conviction most likely resulted in the return of remains, the laws did
not contain explicit provisions for return. Moreover, criminal statutes rely upon
the state to pursue conviction. In the Thompson case mentioned above, for
example, the state only brought charges for the taking of a white female
corpse.144 Yet, the defendants had also been apprehended with the bodies of
three African Americans.145 Therefore, American criminal law was insufficient
to curtail grave robbing.
The ineffective criminal system was paired with the non-existent civil
system. Families who found themselves the victims of grave robbing had no civil
recourse to reclaim remains or seek redress under the inherited common law. As
discussed above, the received common law from Britain held that the limited
interests in the remains held by the executor of the estate ceased with the initial
burial. The problem of grave robbing did not cease until legislatures provided
legal means for acquiring adequate numbers of remains and civil liability for
maltreatment of a corpse was recognized. Both of these developments occurred
on a broader scale in American states after the Civil War.
Under the inherited common law, human remains were vulnerable to a
number of harms, including grave robbing. In particular, the inherited common
law included no provisions for kin to control or protect remains after they were
interred. Claiming jurisdiction and quasi-property proved to be American
courts’ answer to this problem, yet it did not emerge until the 1870s. As the
139. Humphrey, supra note 116, at 819 (quoting 1 HARRIET MARTINEAU, RETROSPECT OF WESTERN
TRAVEL 140 (London, Saunders & Otley 1838)).
140. Todd L. Savitt, The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and Demonstration in the Old South,
48 J. S. HIST. 331, 339 (1982).
141. Waite, supra note 118, at 283–84.
142. SAPPOL, supra note 114, at 107.
143. Waite, supra note 118, at 275.
144. Thompson v. State, 58 S.W. 213, 213 (Tenn. 1900).
145. Id. at 214.
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example of grave robbing demonstrates, the limitations of the inherited common
law regarding the possession and control of human remains existed prior to the
Civil War. Yet it was not until after the War that these vulnerabilities and
limitations became widely acknowledged, and legal changes were enacted as a
remedy.
Part IV discusses the legal responses developed after the War. Before
turning to these legal developments, it is important to first understand the forces
underlying them. The next Part turns to the Civil War to highlight four sociohistoric changes that this paper argues played a major role in engendering
disaffection with the existing legal system. After the Civil War the inherited
common law went from troublesome to intolerable.

III. THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL WAR
The American Civil War “was the most deadly conflict in the nation’s
history, with the North and South losing a total of more than 600,000
individuals.”146 The carnage drastically transformed Americans’ views of death
and the status of remains of the dead. This Article argues there were four changes
that were particularly important for increasing awareness of the inadequacies of
the inherited common law, and engendered commitment to transforming the
legal status of human remains. First, the war precipitated a growing belief in the
importance of medical dissection and general acceptance of the practice of
embalming. Second, the growth of both of these practices expanded the
commercialization of, and commercial transactions pertaining to, human
remains. Third, the geographic distance between the dead and their families
produced a system of identification, transport, and repatriation of human
remains on an unprecedented level. Fourth, all of these factors contributed to the
movement of human remains outside of the private and religious sphere and into
more public spheres wherein third parties became active participants in the care
and treatment of remains. As will be discussed in the final Part, all of these
changes resulted in altered beliefs about the status and treatment of the dead that
were incompatible with the existing legal system.
A. GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF DISSECTION AND EMBALMING
Formal anatomical dissection in America began in the mid-1760s at King’s
College147 under the instruction of British immigrant Samuel Clossy.148 After
independence, dissection continued to proliferate “as a fundamental procedure
for the anatomical training of medical professionals in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century.”149 This created sizable demand for corpses as medical
schools increased from five in 1810, to sixty-five in 1860, to over a hundred and
146. LADERMAN, supra note 136, at 96.
147. King’s College would become Columbia University after the Revolutionary War. History, COLUMBIA
UNIV., https://www.columbia.edu/content/history (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
148. SAPPOL, supra note 114, at 105.
149
149. LADERMAN, supra note 136, at 81.
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twenty in 1890.150 Tensions developed between the medical establishment,
which sought access to corpses, and the general public, who found dissection
repulsive and sacrilegious. Puritan Protestant ideology, which was the dominant
ideology in early America, held “deeply rooted social conventions” which
demanded that corpses be “disposed of through the proscribed procedures.”151
For the majority of the population the hastening of the natural decay of the body
through dissection was “shameful and offensive to standards of public
decency.”152 Thus, prior to the Civil War, the American public perceived
dissection as a gross assault upon the remains.
In the midst of the carnage of the war, Americans’ understanding of the
treatment and meaning of the dead shifted as “[s]cientific and medical
perspectives on the dead body gained legitimacy.”153 Consequently, “older
models for interpreting the meaning of death, as well as disposing of corpses,
were no longer viable.”154 Religious institutions were no longer perceived to
have a monopoly on the treatment and care of human remains. The medical
profession was increasingly accepted. Nowhere is this more evident than in the
spread of both dissection and embalming over the course of the war.
The Civil War engendered belief in necessity of dissection and acceptance
of the use of non-criminal corpses for medical education. In 1862, an Army
Medical Museum was created to catalogue and display human body parts with
injuries of particular medical interest, with the intention of creating a repository
of knowledge that could be used to reduce future casualties.155 Field surgeons
throughout the country were requested to submit preserved specimens.156 At
first, the Museum’s requests were met with indifference or refusal.157 Gradually,
the value of the Museum was recognized and its mandate was accepted. By
January of 1863, the Museum published a catalog containing 1349 specimens.158
Crucially, soldiers and the public began to identify dissection, preservation, and
display of human remains with helping the war effort and saving lives. For
example, the curator of the collection, Dr. John Brinton, was able to convince
the objecting friends of a fallen soldier who had a “remarkable injury” of the
“glory of a patriot having part of his body . . . under the special guard of his
country.”159 The trend was not, however, driven simply by nationalism and
150. Emily Bazelon, Grave Offense, LEGAL AFFS. (July–Aug. 2002), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/
July-August-2002/story_bazelon_julaug2002.msp.
151. LADERMAN, supra note 136, at 29–49.
152. Id. at 82.
153. Id. at 85.
154. Id.
155. U.S. Army Maj. John Hill Brinton, NAT’L MUSEUM OF HEALTH AND MED., http://www.medical
museum.mil/index.cfm?p=about.directors.brinton (May 14, 2012).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. LADERMAN, supra note 136, at 146–47. As a side comment, it is interesting to note here, that after the
war, the displays at the museum became a popular attraction to the public. Moreover, as if straight out of
Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend, it was noted by curators that, “maimed soldiers also visited the museum, often in
search of missing limbs.” Id. at 147.
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appreciation of scientific knowledge. Rather, scholars have noted that, over the
course of the war, “the integrity of the body, so cherished by northern
Protestants . . . became less important than other concerns—medical
intervention to save the life of a soldier, [and] improvement of medical
knowledge.”160 The circumstances created by the Civil War pushed Americans
to accept previously abhorrent treatment of human remains in the form of
dissection, preservation and display.
These changes were reflected in the law surrounding the provision of
corpses for medical dissection. Before the Civil War, fledgling efforts were
made to provide corpses for burial. In 1832, England passed a law, known as the
Anatomy Act.161 Under the law, unclaimed cadavers and remains that needed to
be buried at public expense were made available for dissection.162 The law also
included a provision, at Jeremy Bentham’s insistence, permitting body
donation.163 While controversial in the United Kingdom at the time, the law’s
provisions were soon accepted and the law persisted until 1984.164
Massachusetts passed a similar law in 1831.165 The law was updated several
times, and survived numerous repeal efforts through the 1840s.166 Connecticut
passed a law in 1833, but a year later, it was repealed.167 New Hampshire
similarly passed an act in 1834, but repealed it in 1842.168 In Maine,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Vermont legislation was discussed but was never
formalized.169 New York initiated an anatomy bill in 1831, but did not pass a
law until 1854.170 Many of the laws were designed specifically to curtail grave
robbing.171 Prior to the passage of the New York bill between 600 and 700
graves were illicitly emptied annually in New York City.172 Thus, before the
Civil War, only five states passed anatomy laws before 1860, and three were
shortly repealed.173
Anatomy laws gained traction shortly after the Civil War. By the early
1880s, fourteen of the thirty-eight states had passed similar laws,174 and by 1913,
with the exception of Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee and North Carolina, all
states with medical schools had laws which permitted medical schools to
160. Id. at 145.
161. Anatomy Act 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4 c. 75 (UK).
162. Id.
163. RICHARDSON, supra note 113, at 159–60.
164. Anatomy Act 1984, c. 14 (UK).
165. SAPPOL, supra note 114, at 122.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 122, 134.
171. SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 77 J. OF THE SENATE 529 (1854); see also Foley v. Phelps, 37
N.Y.S. 471, 553 (App. Div. 1896).
172. Humphrey, supra note 116, at 821.
173. SAPPOL, supra note 114, at 5.
174. Id. However, it is worth noting that many of these states were newer states, which lacked established
medical schools.
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appropriate the deceased bodies of the indigent poor for dissection.175 While the
passage of these acts helped protect the sanctity of the buried dead by providing
a legally accessible supply of corpses for medical schools, in many cases this
meant that instead of having to dig up a body from a potter’s field, the deceased
would be delivered directly to a medical school. Laws permitting the allocation
of unknown and unclaimed corpses in morgues to medical schools persist today.
New York only modified its practice of making unclaimed and insolvent dead
bodies available for medical research and education in 2016.176
In addition to prior disdain for the practice of dissection, most Americans
had opposed the practice of embalming. Prior to the Civil War, entombment and
burial were considered the two proper methods for disposing of the dead.177
Since 1840, the American medical community had been comfortable with the
practice of embalming, but it was used exclusively in the context of dissection.178
Commonly held prejudices against the procedure were overcome during the war
as families who had the financial resources sought to reclaim the remains of their
loved ones. Given that most Northern soldiers died on Southern soil,
preservatives were needed to prevent decomposition and protect public health.
While inventive methods such as packing the corpse in a cask of whiskey were
used,179 embalming became commonplace, particularly among the upper
classes. Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., for instance, noted that “[t]he slain of higher
condition, ‘embalmed’ and iron-cased, were sliding off the railways to their far
homes; the dead of the rank and file were being gathered up and committed
hastily to the earth.”180 By the end of the war, embalming had become the default
procedure in some Union hospitals. During the last year of the war, “all the dead
at the Armory Square Military Hospital in Washington were embalmed in case
the family requested shipment.”181 Most tellingly, the remains of President
Lincoln were embalmed prior to their display and transport back to Illinois.182
Consequently, by the end of the Civil War, beliefs about the symbolism
and proper treatment of human remains had shifted dramatically. Americans
became more accepting of both dissection and embalming of human remains.
Scientific conceptions of the body and human remains became more widespread
and were no longer restricted to medical professionals. As will be shown in the
next Subparts, these changes enabled even greater shifts in the socio-cultural
status of human remains in America.

175. Id.
176. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4211–4212 (McKinney 2019); see also Nina Bernstein, Unearthing
the Secrets of New York’s Mass Graves, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2016/05/15/nyregion/new-york-mass-graves-hart-island.html.
177. Bernstein, supra note 176.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also DREW GILPIN FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL
WAR 92 (2008).
180. Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., My Hunt After the Captain, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1862), http://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/1862/12/my-hunt-after-the-captain/308750/.
181. FAUST, supra note 179, at 92.
182. Id. at 116.
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B. COMMERCIALIZATION
Prior to the Civil War, human remains were managed privately and rarely
commodified. Transactions pertaining to human remains, in the form of casket
makers and headstone carvers, were part of the American economy before the
Civil War.183 Yet, “[b]efore the 1880s no funeral industry existed to provide
goods and services for the dead or the survivors in any uniform, dependable
manner.”184 In the medical sphere, dissection did contribute to the
commercialization of human remains before the Civil War. Both medical
students and professors paid to acquire human remains for dissection.185
However, the acceptance of commercialization was restricted to the medical
community, and those who procured remains. This Article argues that it was
after the Civil War that the commercialization of human remains expanded to
the general population.
Economic transactions pertaining to human remains became increasingly
common as a result of the Civil War. Notably, as the practice of embalming
became accepted and popular, professional embalmers emerged.186 For example,
in 1863, the Washington, D.C. City Directory included three embalmers.187
Embalming proved a lucrative profession during and after the war. Thomas
Holmes, one of the best-known embalmers to emerge during the Civil War,
embalmed more than four thousand soldiers charging one hundred dollars
each.188 Additionally, families seeking to locate remains often hired private
detectives to discover the location and exhume remains. The practice of
contracting with third parties to discover the location of and recover remains
continued long after the conclusion of the war.189 Moreover, the practice of
contracting with carriers to ship remains became widespread during this time.190
One Union soldier in 1862 wrote home that “he and his comrades had
contributed $140 to embalm and ship [home] the bodies of two soldiers killed in
his company.”191

183. LADERMAN, supra note 136, at 45–47. Laderman has noted that,
[i]n the urban centers of the North, the dead were no longer simply prepared, transported, and
buried by an intimate group of relations. Rather, they were becoming the focus of a developing
economic regime that was determined by consumerism, class differentiation, and mass-produced
goods. It should be stressed, however, that before the Civil War this regime was fragmented,
disorganized, and irregular, and that the body itself was not yet a commodity in any sense of the
word.
Id. at 47.
184. Id. at 9.
185. See Humphrey, supra note 116, at 819–21.
186. LADERMAN, supra note 136, at 8. The first annual meeting of the Funeral Directors’ National
Association occurred in 1882.
187. FAUST, supra note 179, at 95.
188. Id. at 94. Thomas Holmes has no discernable relationship to Oliver Wendell Holmes.
189. Id. at 102.
190. Id. at 80–87.
191. Id. at 87.
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The commercialization of the management of human remains contributed
to objectification and commercialization of human remains in and of themselves.
Throughout the war, many members of American society, from embalmers to
private detectives, came to conceive of human remains as a source of income,
and even a commodity. Further, although family members during this time were
likely more focused on the symbolic and emotional meaning of the return of
remains, commerce became inextricably intertwined with the dead. Previously
“priceless” remains came to have ascribable values. One hundred dollars for
embalming and delivery was in part payment for the procedure, but it was also
payment to preserve and acquire a particular corpse. During the Civil War, the
Union government received thousands of complaints from families of negligent
or sham embalmers.192 The surviving case law does not record any tort or
contract suits brought during this time. However, given the coverage in the press
of such socially inflammatory issues,193 society and contemporary judges would
have certainly been aware of the problem. Thus, over the course of the Civil
War, the American populace became increasingly familiar with commercial
transactions pertaining to human remains. Conception of ascribing value and
financial damages to human remains became increasingly possible.
C. RECLAIMING AND PROTECTING
In addition to commercial transactions to secure the embalming and return
of remains, Americans developed and expanded an entire system for exhuming,
transporting, and reburying remains. As noted above, private detectives were
employed by family members to locate and repatriate remains of soldiers. It is
estimated that fifteen hundred Union bodies were privately shipped home
shortly after Gettysburg.194 Slain Confederate soldiers were also retrieved from
battle and were often carried home by the very slaves they had brought with
them.195
This system, it is argued, encouraged the development of societal
expectations relating to rights over and duties to kin of human remains. First, as
was discussed in Part I, under the inherited British common law, kin did not have
the legal right to exhume remains, nor did they have any legal authority over
those remains once they were exhumed. Prior to the Civil War, most Americans
died where they had lived. Few would have intimately understood the necessity
of a means to legally exhume, transport and select a location for reburial. Thus,
the general population and the legal system prior to the war was not particularly
concerned by the limitations of this rule. As a result of the war, Americans
exhumed and transported remains on an unprecedented scale. Second, in
conjunction with an emerging societal conviction of the importance of the ability
to exhume and rebury, Americans likely adopted a more modern understanding
of retaining rights, such as the ability to exclude, over human remains without
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 90.
Id.
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having physical control. The rise of management and physical control over
human remains by third parties in America during the Civil War would have
engendered, or deepened, commitment to rights and interests independent from
physical possession.
D. THE RISE OF THIRD PARTIES
For much of human history, death was a very private matter. Individuals
died at home, and bodies were cared for in the home and interred on family or
nearby church land. The individuals who attended to and managed human
remains were family members. Non-family members would have likely been
known members, like the local priest. The majority of disputes that did not
involve grave robbing would have arisen between family members or close
friends. As noted by Robert Ellickson, these types of circumstances lead to
situations where regulation comes from social norms and disputes are resolved
extra-legally.196
The rise of embalming, commercialization, and transportation entailed that
remains were now handled by distant third parties. For the Civil War dead,
thousands of miles separated family members from the remains of their loved
ones. A wide variety of unidentified actors, from government nurses to railroad
workers, now handled remains. Given these changes, it is increasingly
understandable that the individuals would begin to rely upon the formal legal
system. Whereas civil law could have been conceived of as intruding upon
private family matters before, with the changes wrought by the Civil War, death
and the dead were no longer a private matter.
Thus, the Civil War shifted American socio-cultural beliefs about the
nature and treatment of the corpse. In a war wherein almost every person lost a
relative, or at least someone they knew, the importance of legally protecting this
authority would have been increasingly obvious to every American. Prior beliefs
about the nature of the corpse were challenged as human remains became
increasingly objectified and commercialized. Expectations shifted as Americans
sought to reclaim and transport remains. As will be shown in Part IV, these
changes are significant not only because they represent socio-cultural shifts, but
because they are legally relevant. These socio-cultural changes influenced how
Americans understood the legal status and regulation of human remains. Beliefs
about the appropriateness of legal intervention, authority of kin to control
remains, and receipt of financial damages were no longer compatible with the
inherited British common law.
In the post-Civil War era, disinterment by kin, rather than by grave robbers,
became increasingly prevalent. Familial disputes and migration led to legal
requests to disinter and move remains. Additionally, as remains began to
increasingly be handled by third parties, cases involving negligent treatment of

196. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
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remains began to arise. As will be shown, the failures of the common law with
regards to grave robbing produced similar failings in these cases. American
judges therefore confronted two questions regarding the inherited common law:
Should they establish jurisdiction over human remains? And should they uphold
the no-property rule? American judges first confronted these questions shortly
after independence, and, as will be shown, some changes, particularly regarding
jurisdiction, were initiated before the Civil War. It was not until after the Civil
War that more fundamental changes were initiated, which would completely
reshape the regulation of human remains in America.

IV. BREAKING FROM THE INHERITED COMMON LAW IN AMERICA
After independence, the American judiciary faced a conundrum regarding
the status of the entirety of the inherited common law from England.197 States
varied in their response to the questionable legitimacy of British law, but byand-large British cases and treatises were frequently cited. In particular,
Blackstone’s treatise on the common law remained one of the most influential
legal works in America.198 Blackstone’s continued popularity derived from two
features. First, during a time in which law books were scarce, Blackstone’s
Commentaries was one of the more readily available works.199 This was
particularly true at the start of the nineteenth century when American editions
began to be published.200 Second, Blackstone’s reliance on natural law theory
“gave the common law a seeming universality that allowed the Americans to
retain it despite its British taint.”201
The inherited human remains law had been established for hundreds of
years and was explicitly supported by Blackstone.202 Yet, as was shown in Part
I, it also produced a system that had essentially no legal infrastructure for
recognizing or protecting interests in human remains, and explicitly disavowed
the application of property law. As the next Subpart will show, American judges
broke from the inherited common law first by establishing jurisdiction over
human remains. Jurisdiction laid the groundwork, but in and of itself did not
fundamentally reshape the preexisting law or remedy the defects noted above.
The introduction of a novel legal category, quasi-property, fundamentally
reshaped American regulation of human remains. It was only after the Civil War,
in the 1870s, that Blackstone’s no-property rule was struck down, and quasiproperty was introduced.203 Moreover, it was only after the Civil War that the
rejection of the inherited common law and the adoption of quasi-property

197. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO -AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 842 (Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2009).
198. Id. at 841.
199. Id
200. Id. at 841–42.
201. Id. at 842.
202. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 6, at *236.
203. See AMERICAN LAW TIMES, supra note 80, at 128–29.
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became widespread. Quasi-property quickly grew to become the dominant legal
category for human remains in America.204
A. CLAIMING JURISDICTION
America never adopted ecclesiastical courts, and, consequently, matters
traditionally held to fall under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, such as marriage, were
frequently subsumed within the umbrella of the common law. It was, however,
by no means certain that secular courts had authority over burial and human
remains, and early American courts grappled with whether or not they had
jurisdiction.
One of the first, and certainly best documented, cases to address subject
matter jurisdiction was the 1856 case In re Beekman Street.205 The case centered
on the proposed widening of a New York City street which required the removal
of many corpses from a graveyard.206 The daughter of one of the decedents
requested compensation so that she might re-inter her father’s remains in another
graveyard.207 However, under the dictates of the ecclesiastical authority over
cemeteries and the confines of British law, the court was pressed to justify its
jurisdiction over the case and provide a legal rationale for upholding her request.
To determine its authority, the court commissioned Samuel Ruggles to
produce a report.208 Ruggles was a law graduate of Yale College, a member of
the New York elite who served as a member of the New York State Assembly,
and was the cousin of Charles Ruggles, the Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals.209 Ruggles’ report provided a sweeping overview of English legal
history pre-dating the Norman conquest. He argued that common law courts had
preexisting authority over human remains and had abdicated this authority to
ecclesiastical courts when they were established.210 Given that ecclesiastical
courts had never been established in America,211 jurisdiction, according to

204. By 1899, a note in the Yale Law Journal commented, that, “[t]he English common law rule was that
there could be no property in a human body. Our courts early recognized a quasi property right, holding that
English precedent is not binding here . . . .” Editorials, 8 YALE L.J. 362, 363 (1899).
205. In re Widening of Beekman St., 4 Brad. 503, 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856). Bradford’s reported on the
cases before the New York courts. More modern sources have cited Bradford’s report of the Beekman case as
containing the judicial opinion. Bradford’s report actually contains a version of the report written by Samuel
Ruggles that was commissioned by the court and likely formed the basis of the actual opinion. See generally
SAMUEL B. RUGGLES, AN EXAMINATION OF THE LAW OF BURIAL, IN A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWYORK (1856). Later scholars noted that, “[t]he foregoing is the premier American case on the right to burial of a
dead body, and the holding therein . . . has been generally followed.” Kuzenski, supra note 16, at 17.
206. Beekman, 4 Brad. at 503.
207. Id. at 507.
208. Beekman, 4 Brad. at 508.
209. An Old New Yorker Gone: The Busy Life of Samuel B. Ruggles Brought to a Close, N.Y. Times, Aug.
29, 1881, at A8.
210. Id. at 519.
211. Ruggles commented that “[t]he liberty-loving, God-fearing Englishman, who founded these American
States, had seen enough and felt enough of ‘ecclesiastical cognizance,’ and they crossed a broad and stormy
ocean to a new and untrodden continent, to escape from it for ever.” RUGGLES, supra note 205, at 49. It should
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Ruggles, reverted to the common law. Moreover, because ecclesiastical courts
had “materially narrowed the powers and the actions of the courts of common
law. . . . the decisions and dicta of their courts and legal writers on [the matter
of the dead], ought not to exert any controlling influence.”212 Ruggles therefore
rejected the inherited British common law precedent and argued that American
courts had jurisdiction over human remains.
Ruggles went further and rejected both the limitations on the right to
possess for burial and the no-property rule.213 Arguing that “every dictate of
common sense and common decency demand a common protection for the grave
and all its contents and appendages [not just clothes found therein].”214 Ruggles
asserted that American courts should recognize more than the right to possess
for burial, “in order decently to . . . secure [a corpse’s] undisturbed repose.”215
Specifically, Ruggles advanced a “right to protect the remains [that] includes the
right to preserve them by separate burial, to select the place of sepulture, and to
change it at pleasure. . . . [I]f the place of burial be taken for public use, the next
of kin may claim to be indemnified for the expense of removing and suitably reinterring the remains.”216 Further, he vested these rights with the next of kin, not
the executor of the estate. Kin should not only have rights to unburied remains,
but also retain rights after burial.217 Lastly, Ruggles derived the kin’s right, not
from a legal duty to bury for health and safety, but from their duties to care for
the corpse “arising out of our common humanity.”218 Thus, it is worth noting
that under Ruggles’ conception kin’s rights persist even if the duty to bury
disappeared because they conceived of liberty, privacy, or property rights
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.219
Ruggles rejected the inherited common law in part by asserting subject
matter jurisdiction over the buried human remains and vesting rights with kin.
He did not completely reject the inherited common law because he did not
be noted that the court in Meagher, made no mention of ecclesiastical courts, but this is understandable given
that their aim was to uphold, rather than reject, the no-property rule.
212. Beekman, 4 Brad. at 517 (“In resorting to England for light on this subject, we encounter a body of law
grown up under circumstances differing widely from our own. The jurisprudence of that country is peculiarly
compounded, embracing largely the ecclesiastical element, from which ours is exempt; and it has given birth to
anomalies which we are hardly required to adopt. This is strikingly manifest in the matter of the dead, in which
the partition of juridical authority between the Church and the State, forming one composite system, has
materially narrowed the powers and the action of the courts of common law. It is believed that an attentive
examination . . . will show . . . that the decisions and dicta of their courts and legal writers on this subject, ought
not to exert any controlling influence . . . .”). Ruggles then described the regulation of burial from Celtic and
Roman times to prove that the common law had original authority over burial. Id. at 517–18.
213. Ruggles directly attacked Coke and his assertion that human remains are nullius in bonis. Id. at 520.
214. Id. at 522.
215. Id. at 529.
216. RUGGLES, supra note 205, at 58–59.
217. Beekman, 4 Brad. at 532.
218. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 242–43 (1872); see also Larson v. Chase,
50 N.W. 238, 309 (Minn. 1891).
219. Although there are no cases that debate the point exactly, in the autopsy consent jurisprudence it is
taken for granted that a due process claim could apply. See Leno v. St. Joseph Hosp., 302 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Ill.
1973). In Brotherton v. Cleveland, this interest was deemed as rising to the point of a constitutionally protected
property right. 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
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address the no-property rule, nor did he advance a reformation of the legal status
of human remains. No independent opinion of the judges in Beekman was either
written or survives. From Bradford’s reporter it is known that the court affirmed
the report in its entirety.220 The daughter was declared entitled to possession of
the remains and granted one hundred dollars in payment.221
The Ruggles report and the Beekman case are important because they
represent the first known challenge to the inherited British common law. The
case set a critical precedent and laid a foundation for future changes. At the time,
the proposed changes seem to have little impact outside of New York state. It
was not, however, until after the Civil War that the impact of the case became
widespread. After the war, a majority of states began to reference Beekman and
to recognize the authority of both secular courts and kin.222 Notably, opinions
throughout the postwar period pertaining to human remains all first address the
question of subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the substantive issue.223
It would take until the twentieth century for jurisdiction to be taken for granted
in all states. Moreover, as will be shown, American judges after independence
adopted and perpetuated the no-property rule. Articulation of a complete
transformation of the status of human remains would not occur until after the
Civil War.
B. ADOPTING QUASI-PROPERTY
At first, after independence, many American judges adopted and upheld
the no-property rule.224 For instance, in 1836 in In re Brick Presbyterian Church
Petition, the New York Chancery Court adjudicated a dispute regarding a
petition to sell a church and its burial grounds.225 In passing, the court cited
Blackstone to hold that an “heir has no right of property in the bodies or ashes
of his ancestor.”226 Similarly, in 1862 in Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, a dispute arose

220. Beekman, 4 Brad. at 532.
221. Id.
222. For example, a Kentucky court of appeals noted that, “[t]his doctrine [of lack of jurisdiction] has been
generally, though not universally, repudiated by American courts. One (if not the pioneer) opinion to that effect
was delivered in Re Beckman St. . . . The reasoning in this opinion appears to have been satisfactory to many of
the courts in this country.” Neighbors v. Neighbors, 65 S.W. 607, 608 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901); see also Finley v.
Atl. Transp. Co. Ltd., 153 N.Y.S. 439, 441 (Sup. Ct. 1915), aff’d, 157 N.Y.S. 1124 (App. Div. 1916), aff’d, 115
N.E. 715 (N.Y. 1917); Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904); Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal.
1900); Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422, 423 (1880); Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. 293, 301–02 (1862).
223. See Neighbors, 65 S.W. at 608; Pierce, 10 R.I. at 232; Wynkoop, 42 Pa. at 300–01.
224. Long v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 86 P. 289, 290 (Okla. 1905); Griffith v. Charlotte, C. & A.R. Co.,
23 S.C. 25, 39 (1885); Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 284 (1868); In re Brick Presbyterian Church’s
Petition, 3 Edw. Ch. 155, 168 (N.Y. Ch. 1837).
225. Brick Presbyterian, 3 Edw. Ch. at 155.
226. Id. at 168. In truth, it should be noted that, in many of the early cases that applied the English noproperty rule, the status of the corpse was not a necessary determination. In Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, the
outcome of the case did not, in the end, turn on the property status of the remains in the cemetery. 13 Ind. 134,
138 (1859). The court held that the burial ground could not be sold without the permission of the vault-holders
as owners of the land. Id.
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over the burial of a deceased colonel.227 His wife sought an injunction from the
court to disinter the body, which had been buried against her wishes by the
deceased’s mother and siblings in their family mausoleum.228 The lawyers for
both sides addressed the status of the remains, and, interestingly, both sides
accepted the no-property rule.229 Additionally, in Meagher v. Driscoll, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld the no-property rule.230 In 1868, the
court held that at common law, “[a] dead body is not the subject of
property . . . The only action that can be brought for disinterring it is trespass
quare clausum.”231 The court’s decision on the status of the body drew
exclusively from British law. The court cited Blackstone at length and pointed
to three British cases.232 Thus, in numerous states after independence, judges
accepted and perpetuated the inherited no-property rule.
It was not until the 1870s that an American court rejected the no-property
rule, and held, for the first time, that human remains were quasi-property. On
Tuesday, November 8, 1870, a woman named Emily Thilman passed away in
Cincinnati, Ohio.233 At the time of her death, she was presumed to be a widow
and her body was taken to the Women’s Medical College to perform a dissection
of her throat in order to ascertain cause of death.234 Her local friends attempted
to arrange a burial but were informed proper arrangements were already made
by the Medical College.235 Instead, the College conducted a fake burial with a
filled coffin and retained the body for further dissection.236 News of the scandal
was published in local newspapers in a series of articles that chronicled the
uncovering of the illicit behavior by the College.237 Her presumably estranged

227. Wynkoop, 42 Pa. at 293.
228. Id. at 302.
229. Id. at 298, 299. This is a relatively ancient maxim drawn from English common law that “[t]he duty of
the executor or administrator is over, and also his rights, except in case of an improper interference with the
grave, the body, or the grave-clothes of the deceased. The claims of society have been entirely satisfied.” Id. at
301. The widow’s counsel focused instead on the widow’s independent right as the administratrix of her
husband’s estate to control the burial of the deceased. Id. at 299–300. He focused the case on her privacy rights
as a widow and an administratrix. Id. The opinion of the court reflected this focus and did not make a single
mention of the word property or address the status of the remains. Id. at 302. The ruling focused entirely on the
respective privacy rights of both parties and drew from the precedent that once buried, the duties to and rights
over the remains held by the administrator or next of kin cease. Id. at 303.
230. Meagher, 99 Mass. at 284.
231. Id.
232. Id. “[T]hough the heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has
none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against such as indecently at least, if not impiously,
violate and disturb their remains when dead and buried.” Id. (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*429; Corven’s Case (1826) 77 Eng. Rep. 1380 (K.B.); Haynes’s Case (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1389 (K.B.); R. v.
Lynn (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B.)). As an aside, it should be noted that the court made no mention of
ecclesiastical courts, but this is understandable given that their aim was to uphold, rather than reject, the English
no-property rule.
233. Sequel to “A Singular Proceeding”, supra note 82.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. A Singular Proceeding, supra note 85; Sequel to “A Singular Proceeding”, supra note 82.
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husband eventually learned of the circumstances surrounding her death, traveled
to Cincinnati to reclaim her body and sued the Medical College.238
Unfortunately, this case was by all accounts forgotten until now. Legal
scholars and judges cite the 1872 case Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point
Cemetery239 as the first case to apply quasi-property status.240 In Pierce, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that although “there is no right or property
in a dead body, using the word in its ordinary sense, may well be admitted. . . . it
may therefore be considered as a sort of quasi property.”241 As discussed in Part
I, Pierce grew out of a dispute between a daughter, and sole heir at law, and her
father’s widow242 over the burial of her father. Thirteen years after the initial
burial of the father, his widow had the remains removed and reburied in another
plot.243 The daughter sued to return the remains to the original plot.244 Given that
the opinion is typically credited with initiating the application of quasi-property
to human remains, it is worth exploring in some detail. Judge Potter’s opinion is
also paradigmatic of many of later cases that adopted quasi-property because it
exhibits judicial concern about jurisdictional authority and a deep-seated belief
about the necessity of providing a remedy.
Commenting on the novelty of the situation, Judge Potter first confronted
the court’s authority to adjudicate and went to great lengths to assert
jurisdictional authority. He noted that while “[c]onsent of course cannot give
jurisdiction. . . . [W]e think there is no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court in
this case.”245 The court was faced with the inherited common law restrictions
discussed above. First, as the widow’s counsel drew to the judges’ attention by
citing Lord Coke, matters of burial are not encompassed within the British
common law, but are instead matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance.”246 Second,
according to the British common law, cadavers are not property,247 and “[e]quity
has no jurisdiction except in cases where rights of property are concerned.”248
The court’s treatment of this issue is a noteworthy navigation around
distinctions between common law and equity and an attempt to balance British
precedent. The opinion reasoned that given the British abdication of authority
238. Another Letter from Mr. Thilman, supra note 85; Seeking for Justice, supra note 81.
239. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872).
240. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Citation to Pierce by later courts is understandable given
that the case is by a state supreme court, as opposed to a lower court. Thilman remained hidden, I believe, because
the full opinion does not survive, the case is not contained in Westlaw or Lexis, and it requires putting together
newspaper clippings and legal journal publications from the 1870s together to understand the case.
241. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 237–38.
242. As mentioned above, the record is unclear as to whether the wife was the mother or stepmother of the
daughter. The facts suggest she was a stepmother.
243. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 228. The father was a Unitarian during his lifetime and had secured burial plots in
the unitarian section of the cemetery. Id. The widow appears to have undergo a religious conversion after his
death as she moved him to another (unnamed) denomination’s section of the cemetery. Id.
244. Id. at 228–29.
245. Id. at 243.
246. Id. at 232.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 231.
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over burial law to ecclesiastical courts, “[i]n cases like the present no common
law action could avail much. . . . [However,] [e]quity . . . can give a full and
complete remedy, and we think the jurisdiction is fully adequate to it.”249 The
finding that equity can provide a remedy is preceded by a lengthy quote by the
writers. The opinion stated that, “‘the common law is not in its nature and
character an absolutely fixed, inflexible system . . . . It is rather a system of
elementary principles and of general juridical truths, which are continually
expanding with the progress of society.”250
Having established its jurisdiction, the court concluded that existing
remedies were inadequate. The opinion noted,
[i]n the case at bar there has been committed a public wrong. A dead body has
been illegally disinterred. This is an indictable offence. There has also been a
private injury committed for which the complainants have their action of
trespass quare clausum against both respondents. But this is not full or
adequate relief. The complainants have other rights which call upon the
protecting power of a court of chancery “to preserve the repose of the ashes
of the dead, and the religious sensibilities of the living.”251

Consequently, the court held that the body of the deceased is “a sort of
quasi property, to which certain persons may have rights, as they have duties to
perform towards it arising out of our common humanity.”252 The court made
clear that quasi-property is “not property in the usually recognized sense of the
word.”253 Rather, quasi-property in human remains is specifically limited to the
right to “hold[] [the remains] only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may
from family or friendship have an interest in it.”254 As applied in this case, a
quasi-property right, unlike the inherited British common law to possess remains
awaiting burial, does not disappear upon burial. A quasi-property right extends
beyond burial to enable family members to protect and control buried remains.
Unfortunately, Judge Potter did not articulate why the court chose to adopt
quasi-property status. As discussed above, close reading of the opinion reveals
that the status formed the arguments of the plaintiff’s counsel, which were in
turn were most likely drawn from Thilman given that the lawyers cited to the
case. The Thilman case, as argued in Part I, more likely than not, proffered the
framework for the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to adopt.
Quasi-property served the desired outcome of enabling jurisdiction and
facilitating the return of remains. Yet it is notable that Judges Prentiss and Potter,
249. Id. at 242.
250. Id. at 240–41 (citing JOSEPH STORY ET AL., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER
AND REPORT UPON THE PRACTICABILITY AND EXPEDIENCY OF R EDUCING TO A WRITTEN AND SYSTEMATIC CODE
THE COMMON LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS, OR ANY PART THEREOF 8–9 (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1837)).
251. Id. at 233 (citations omitted).
252. Id. at 242–43. Interestingly, the reporter’s notes show that it was the daughter’s counsel who put forth
the argument that a quasi-property claim existed. Id. at 234. He also argued for a more traditional property status.
Id. at 233–34.
253. Id. at 242.
254. Id. at 243. As an aside, the court drew a parallel with the duties to protect the dead with duties to protect
the custody and care of children. Id.
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and ultimately judges across the United States, consciously chose to apply such
an unusual status. Shortly after Pierce, quasi-property quickly rose to become
the dominant legal category for human remains. By 1920, the Michigan Law
Review commented that, “American courts have been almost unanimous in
holding that the right in a corpse is in the nature of a ‘quasi property’ right.”255
Today, quasi-property remains the dominant legal category for human remains.
However, the path to quasi-property was not as direct as it might seem at first
glance. As quasi-property grew in popularity, some early courts chose instead to
apply property law. As will be shown, this proved to be a short-lived experiment.
C. APPLICATION OF PROPERTY STATUS
Some courts during this time period, most notably in Bogert v. City of
Indianapolis256 and Larson v. Chase,257 actually did adopt a property standard
for human remains. In Bogert, the court stated, “we lay down the proposition,
that the bodies of the dead belong to the surviving relations, in the order of
inheritance, as property, and that they have the right to dispose of them as such,
within restrictions analogous to those by which disposition of other property
may be regulated.”258 Larson was a suit revolving around the unlawful dissection
of the plaintiff’s deceased loved one.259 In the opinion the judge focused on the
lack of ecclesiastical courts in America to reject the no-property rule and uphold
that it is
universally held that those who are entitled to the possession and custody of it
for purposes of decent burial have certain legal rights to and in it which the
law recognizes and will protect. . . . [This] leads necessarily to the conclusion
that it is his property in the broadest and most general sense of the term, viz.,
something over which the law accords him exclusive control.260

Despite these rulings, property was largely rejected over the course of time
in favor of quasi-property.261 Interestingly, the plaintiffs’ counsel in Pierce also
made arguments for full property status, but the court declined to follow that set
of arguments.262 On the whole, it seems that although Americans’ views of
255. Recent Important Decisions, 19 MICH. L. REV. 209, 219 (1920).
256. Bogert v. City of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134 (1859).
257. Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238 (Minn. 1891).
258. Bogert, 13 Ind. at 138. Interestingly, the court’s foray into the status of remains is a bit surprising given
the facts of the case. Charles Bogert was employed as a gravedigger by a privately held cemetery and was sued
by the city for violating a local ordinance regulating burials. Id. at 139. The main question before the court was
the validity of the ordinance, so it is peculiar that the judge felt the need to go out of his way to assert that corpses
are property. Id. at 135. Some explanation may be drawn from the fact that the judge was clearly offended not
only at the city’s restriction and control of privately held burial grounds, but also the proposition that “the burial
of the dead can . . . be taken out of the hands of the relatives thereof, they being able and willing to bury the
same.” Id. at 138.
259. Larson, 50 N.W. at 238.
260. Id. at 239.
261. See supra note 16 and text accompanying note.
262. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 233–34, 237–38 (1872). For instance, the
court makes note of the fact that a trespass action for the trespass of removing the body from the owned plot
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human remains had been transformed over the course of the Civil War, they
were not so radically transformed that the majority could accept the sociocultural implications of full property status in human remains. For most lay
Americans, property status entails almost complete decision-making authority
by the owner, including the right to sell. There is no mention in the case law or
literature from the time, but it is likely that full property status of human remains
was not a viable socio-cultural option in nineteenth-century America. Human
remains then, and now, were deeply symbolic and sacred objects. Property status
was likely not compatible with these sentiments,263 and proposals to replace
quasi-property status with property status remain controversial to this day.
The purpose of this Article is not to argue whether courts should adopt
property status or maintain quasi-property status. The key point is that, at the
time quasi-property emerged, there was a period of instability. The competing
status of property was proposed, debated, and largely rejected. This is reflected
not only in the case law but also in the legal literature. Contemporary law review
notes from the time period confirm that property status was quickly deemed
untenable.264 For instance, a 1896 Harvard Law Review student note examining
the Bogert case commented on the “curious dictum to the effect that the bodies
of the dead . . . [are] property.”265 The author noted that,
[n]owhere else has the law relating to dead bodies assumed quite so
commercial a character. To regard a corpse as a piece of property shocks the
sensibilities of the average man. . . . Yet that the surviving relatives, before
burial of the body, have a right of some sort which the law will protect, is
undeniable.266

Later, in 1901 another Harvard Law Review note entitled The Right to
Dispose of the Body by Will stated that, “[t]hough it has been held that a corpse
is a species of property [in Bogert], such a view, it would seem, is erroneous,
and not in accordance with the great weight of authority.”267
Property status was therefore a short-lived experiment in nineteenthcentury American law. From the initial application in 1871 of an obscure legal
category, human remains in the United States were now quasi-property “in
accordance with the great weight of authority.”268

which would result in nominal financial damages does not “afford[] a sufficient remedy, [n]or could
[it] . . . restore the body to the proper custody.” Id. at 242.
263. Surprisingly, although hundreds of thousands of Americans had just died to resolve the question of
whether living human beings could be property, it does not seem that connections were made at the time between
the legal statuses of the living and the dead.
264. Yet, it should be noted that, one Yale Law Journal author in 1906 felt that the ruling in Larson, “seems
to be more in consonance with our enlightened and humane views.” Recent Cases, 15 YALE L.J. 371, 376 (1906).
265. Note, Nature of the Rights in a Dead Body, 10 HARV. L. REV. 51, 51 (1896).
266. Id.
267. Note, The Right to Dispose of the Body by Will, 15 HARV. L. REV. 64, 64 (1901).
268. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The adoption of quasi-property status for human remains in the United
States was not a mere accident, nor was it a passive response to a lack of
ecclesiastical courts in the country. The United States maintained the inherited
British common law no-property rule for almost one hundred years after
independence. Consistent rejection of the no-property rule did not occur until
the late nineteenth century, and the rule was replaced with a novel, uniquely
American legal status: quasi-property. Quasi-property represented, and
continues to serve as, a middle ground. It allowed Americans to recognize
limited rights to kin to protect and control human remains by relying upon the
features of quasi-property, such as a limited right to exclude, which mimic
property rights. Yet, quasi-property did not carry the socio-cultural associations
and stigmas of property status. Quasi-property permits the legal system to
recognize very limited bundles of rights to human remains. Next of kin had
limited rights to possess the body for burial, to control the body, to use it in
certain ways, including burial, and to exclude others. Significantly, the
American invention of quasi-property resolved many of the inherited
deficiencies of the British common law by preserving the authority of kin after
the remains have been buried, ensuring secular jurisdiction, and providing a
body of applicable civil law.
Given the important and misunderstood role that quasi-property plays in
our law, understanding its emergence is of key importance. This Article proved
that quasi-property for human remains did not emerge until the 1870s. It argued
that the Civil War served as the impetus for legal change. Americans became
committed to the necessity of recognizing legal interests in and rights to human
remains. This rendered the inherited common law’s failures intolerable. Given
the social undesirability of property status, American courts were at an impasse
regarding a means of according and protecting individuals’ interests in human
remains. Prior to the Civil War, quasi-property existed as a possible solution,
but had limited application. The application of quasi-property to human remains
emerged at a specific time in American history, it is argued, due to increased
pressure for a viable solution and cultural openness to apply property-esque, but
not full property, rights to human remains as a result of the Civil War. The
dramatic changes in cultural understandings about death and human remains
enabled judges to reject the inherited common law, claim jurisdiction, and apply
the novel category of quasi-property.
Quasi-property continues to be controversial and disordered in
contemporary American law. The aim of this Article is to provide some clarity
regarding the nature of and original intention behind application of this uniquely
American legal category. American law is not static. Quasi-property can, and
should, continue to evolve. As demonstrated by the resilience of the no-property
rule long after independence, it can take national trauma and major sociocultural shifts to motivate changes to the legal status of sacred entities. It is
therefore not surprising that just as the Civil War prompted challenges to the

November 2020]

ORIGINS OF QUASI-PROPERTY

335

legal status of human remains, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks also
prompted legal reconsideration of quasi-property and lamentation of the existing
law. On that day, 2749 people were killed in Towers One and Two of the World
Trade Center in a terrorist attack that rocked the nation.269 Full bodily remains
were only found for 292 victims, and approximately 1100 people died without
any identifiable physical trace.270 As the court in WTC Families for a Proper
Burial noted, “[o]nly dust remains.”271 A coalition of family members sought to
prevent the city from disposing of the “finely-sifted residue of the World Trade
Center debris at the City’s Fresh Kills landfill . . . [and instead] create a cemetery
for the 1,100 who perished.”272 The families’ standing to sue was premised upon
a quasi-property right. The court noted that,
[a]lthough, under New York law, there is a quasi-property right in the remains
of a loved one, here there are no identifiable remains to which a property right
could attach, only an undifferentiated mass of dirt. Furthermore, no individual
family member can establish that his or her family members’ remains are
among the fines at Fresh Kills, for they may have been entirely consumed by
the intense fires. Defendants argue that where there is nothing tangible, there
are no remains, no actual injury, and no standing.273

Despite finding that the city was correct, that under New York law the
families lacked standing to sue due to limitations of quasi-property law, the court
moved to consider the case on the merits because “this is no ordinary
case. . . . WTC Families, and the individual plaintiffs whose lives were turned
on end on September 11th, deserve consideration, on the merits. Society owes
them no less.”274 Yet, even on the merits, the court found that it could not extend
quasi-property to apply to “an undifferentiated mass of dirt . . . . Without
something tangible or identifiable, there is no [quasi-] property right.”275
Consequently, the plaintiffs’ suit was dismissed.276 However, the court lamented
that “[n]ot every wrong can be addressed through the judicial process. The grave
harm suffered by the plaintiffs in this case is undeniable. But the jurisdiction of
a court is limited [by the extent of quasi-property].”277
This case presents just one facet of the debate about whether the application
of quasi-property status can and should evolve to apply to broader categories of
physical entities. The above case is difficult because no remains were physically
identifiable. However, our understanding of this case could change as DNA

269. WTC Families for a Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 567 F. Supp. 2d 529, 531 (S.D.N.Y.
2008), aff’d sub nom. World Trade Ctr. Families for Proper Burial, Inc. v. City of New York, 359 F. App’x 177
(2d Cir. 2009).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 532.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 537.
276. Id. at 543.
277. Id.

336

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:291

identification techniques improve—would the outcome of the case have changed
if invisible but identifiable human DNA had been shown to exist in the “dust?”
On a broader scale, the rise of medical and scientific uses for human
remains is challenging our socio-cultural understanding about the meaning and
status of the human body. An increasing variety of bodily materials can be
harvested from remains. Millions of products are now sold each year that contain
human remains. Often these products are widely divergent from our
understanding of traditional organ transplantation. Bone grafts, for instance, can
involve bone that is harvested from a cadaver, cleaned, processed, and reshaped
such that it is unrecognizable as flesh and blood originating from a human
cadaver. Sanitized uses such as these for human remains are increasingly
commercial and divorced from the focus on burial contained within quasiproperty. Similarly, new uses for human remains challenge the notion of bodies
awaiting burial referenced in the common law discourse on quasi-property. The
status of the remains in Gunther von Hagens’ Body World exhibition as quasiproperty is particularly complicated. Von Hagens developed a system for
preserving flesh known as plastination. He then created a wildly popular touring
exhibit of plastinated human corpses placed in a wide range of poses and
displayed in varying levels of dissection.278 Whereas embalming preserves
human remains for an extended period of time, it was practiced largely within
the context facilitating the most traditional use of human remains, burial.
Plastination transforms remains into commercial and artistic objects for public
display that will last for hundreds of years. These and other technologies have
moved the status, treatment, and use of human remains into even more
complicated territory compared to shifts seen after the Civil War. My guess,
therefore, is that given the extent and nature of the social and technological
changes taking place in contemporary America pertaining to human remains, we
are at a similar crossroads moment in history regarding the legal status of human
remains. For this reason, it is even more important to understand why and how
prior shifts occurred.
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